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INTRODUCTION
Never before has corporate shareholder voting received so much attention from
lawyers, scholars, and policymakers, nor have the possibilities for shareholder
voting reform seemed so vast in the political wake of the financial crises of the past
decade. The Delaware Chancery Court has famously declared that the “shareholder
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial
power rests,”1 but the effective practice of the shareholder franchise to constrain
board discretion under current law is “largely a myth” in practice.2 Reform
advocates are pushing for a major expansion in shareholder authority through
shareholder voting and proxy access that would give shareholders greater ability to
influence management.3 Advocates of shareholder activism, including Lucian

† Copyright © 2013 Michael S. Kang.
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Many thanks to Bobby Ahdieh,
Bobby Bartlett, Bill Carney, Julie Cho, Shmuel Leshem, Robert Schapiro, and Fred Tung for
their feedback on earlier drafts, and many thanks to Will Bradbury, Yilin Chen, Sagiv
Edelman, Madeline Gwyn, and Caitlin Murphy for excellent research assistance.
1. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (advising that “[i]f the
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out”).
2. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
732 (2007).
3. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1347, 1350 (2011) (quoting one expert, among several of the same opinion, as
characterizing current reform efforts as “the biggest change relating to corporate governance
ever proposed by the SEC”); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its
Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013)
(describing current efforts at proxy reform as potentially “revolutioniz[ing] American
corporate governance”).
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Bebchuk, call for increased shareholder voting prerogatives, such as the recent
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposals and majority voting rules,
as a means for restoring accountability to shareholders.4
However, the case against shareholder voting reform rests on an apparent trump
card in the debate—the well-recognized problem of rational ignorance that limits
the effectiveness of shareholder involvement. As Stephen Bainbridge and other
skeptics on shareholder voting argue, shareholders tend to be rationally apathetic in
letting management run the company and deferring to their recommendations in the
usual course of things.5 Information is costly, but the returns to the individual
shareholder for improving corporate performance are distributed pro rata, such that
shareholders rarely have individual economic incentive to engage more than
casually on questions of corporate management. Opponents of reform efforts argue
that “shareholders lack both the information and the incentives necessary to make
sound decisions”6 and thus are rationally ignorant voters who would be better off
vesting authority in management’s hands.7 For this reason, shareholders generally
do not possess any detailed affirmative vision of how the company should operate
itself, nor do they typically wish for greater direct ability to instruct management
on how specifically to run the company.8 Even when given the limited chance to
vote on corporate matters, shareholders defer to management in almost every case.
Many commentators therefore oppose shareholder voting reform and instead
advocate for a model of “director primacy” that places virtually unreviewable,
centralized corporate control in the hands of the board.9
In this Article I offer a very specific response, based in political science, to the
case against shareholder voting reform based on this critique of shareholders’
rational ignorance. The challenges of rational ignorance, as well as related
problems of collective action, that corporate scholars identify as impediments to
sensible shareholder voting are not at all particular to corporate voting. They are
basic constraints that confront all types of voting by large, diffuse electorates,
including voting in democratic government on candidates and policy questions on
the ballot. Voters overcome these constraints, however imperfectly, by gravitating
toward heuristic voting strategies that may work equally well in shareholder voting
and, indeed, may explain why shareholder voting works as it does as currently
practiced.
The best example of such strategies are models of retrospective voting from
political science by which voters vote on the basis of global, ex post assessments of

4. See Bebchuk, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,
53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 623–24 (2006); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and
Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 985 (2001).
6. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 624.
7. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003); Robert S.
Saunders, Why Majority Voting in Director Elections Is a Bad Idea, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
107 (2006).
8. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 402–03 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 7.
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incumbent performance. Just like the typical shareholder, the typical citizen is
rationally ignorant and knows little about the specifics of government policy. But
even rationally ignorant citizens can monitor the general state of affairs at low cost
and reward incumbents for good times, while punishing them for bad times. Of
course, this manner of retrospective voting is quite imprecise and fails the highest
aspirations of deliberative democracy, but as a model of inducing the right
incentives for officeholders, it works reasonably well as a second-best heuristic
strategy and overcomes pervasive rational ignorance. As voting theorists have
observed, retrospective voting provides the basic opportunity for even uninformed
voters to impose democratic accountability by ousting badly performing
incumbents on the simple basis of ex post results.10
I argue that it is useful to view shareholder voting through a similar lens.
Shareholders are rationally ignorant in the sense that they are unlikely to possess ex
ante sophisticated information or detailed affirmative preferences about the best
course of company action. For this reason, shareholders are overwhelmingly
willing to defer to management’s leadership and to its recommendations on
shareholder votes. However, even rationally ignorant shareholders can monitor
their company’s performance at low cost with reference to simple proxies like share
price. Shareholders need not have well-developed affirmative preferences about
company direction in any specific sense to know when management is doing poorly
and may need to be thwarted. Indeed, the average shareholder of a public company
is much more likely, with attention to the company’s share price, to have salient
negative preferences about management than to have developed affirmative
preferences about what the board ought ideally to do. What is more, relative to
voting contexts where many nonfinancial interests may complicate voting
decisions, shareholder voting is narrowly focused on the maximization of company
value.
Shareholders therefore are capable of exercising a degree of ex post
accountability through retrospective voting, despite their rational ignorance. To do
so, shareholders need only to keep a running tally about management’s
competence, informed in large part by the company’s share price, which serves as a
reliable heuristic about whether to defer to management on the discrete binary
questions presented to them.11 When the company’s direction changes and status
quo deference to management is less justified, shareholders can exercise negative

10. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL
ELECTIONS (1981); Donald R. Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewiet, Economic Discontent and
Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in
Congressional Voting, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 495 (1979); Gregory B. Markus, The Impact of
Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled CrossSectional Analysis, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 137 (1988).
11. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 129, 149 (2009) (identifying the “principal signal indicating a deviation of the board
from its duty to the corporation [as] the market price of the corporation’s stock”); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 441 (2001) (“[T]he market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the
principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.”). But see William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010)
(criticizing the accuracy of share price as a measure of company performance).

1302

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1299

preferences—a veto against poor management’s recommendation. When
management performs poorly, shareholders are more likely to discard deference
and vote in a negative consensus against management’s position.12 That is,
shareholders are capable of providing management a great deal of discretion in the
usual case, but exercising a limited veto when necessary.13
In fact, this pattern arguably characterizes a great deal of shareholder voting as
currently practiced. As I describe later, shareholders defer to management
recommendations in shareholder voting as a basic default choice, consistent with
their informational disadvantages relative to management. However, when
shareholders identify poor performance by management, shareholders appear to
punish management and buck its recommendations at a far greater rate. In short,
shareholders use their confidence in management as a cue for how to vote in
relation to management’s recommendation. Shareholders give management wide
berth, deferring in the vast majority of cases, and exercise their voting rights
against management only when necessary to defend themselves against discredited
management.
Of course, a basic obstacle to retrospective voting of the type seen in
government elections is that shareholders have little ability to vote out incumbent
management. Citizens have ample capacity to oust incumbent politicians from
government office, but the removal of incumbents from the board of directors is
much more difficult. As the Delaware Supreme Court recently acknowledged about
board elections, the restrictions on board nomination that enable most candidates to
run unopposed threaten to render shareholder voting “an empty exercise.”14 State
and federal corporate law provides virtually no practical way for shareholders to
defeat a management nominee for the board, at least short of a very expensive
proxy contest.15 It is this regulatory framework that is contested today. Although
the SEC’s recent effort to expand shareholder access to the company’s proxy
materials for nominating board candidates failed,16 it is clear that the political
debate about shareholder voting will continue, and this issue of what shareholder
voting reform would achieve is one of the most important matters in corporate law
at the moment.17
A limited objective here is to highlight the distinction between the affirmative
preferences and negative preferences, as I have sketched out so far. What I call
“affirmative preferences” represent the familiar notion of most preferred outcomes
that voters might seek as ideal goals for corporate policy in voting on shareholder
matters. For instance, pursuing an influential, innovative agenda for corporate
reform, Lucian Bebchuk advocates the expansion of shareholder prerogatives to

12. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 862 (2005); see also Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 680.
13. See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 862.
14. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008).
15. Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy
Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge 5 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11–052, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695666.
16. Id. at 6.
17. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11, at 655–56.
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permit new affirmative rights of initiation that would allow shareholders to propose
and dictate major corporate actions that have traditionally been entrusted to the
board’s discretion. However, most shareholders are typically passive investors with
incomplete and mainly “negative preferences.” They appear to vote mainly on the
basis of latent negative preferences against the recommendations of what has
proved to be bad management, without necessarily possessing any clear affirmative
vision for what management ought to do in most cases. Shareholder voting based
on negative preferences, rather than affirmative ones, defines what shareholder
voting does best.
In other words, any debate over shareholder voting can be about not only the
quantum of power that shareholders ought to hold vis-à-vis the board, but also
about how well the shape of shareholder voting maps onto what shareholders do
well. The debate over shareholder voting is focused almost entirely on the balance
of power between shareholders and management, more specifically the limited
amount of control afforded shareholders.18 The debate contemplates a simple
tradeoff between giving more power to shareholders and granting discretion to
management, but as I have argued, shareholders can possess substantively distinct
types of preferences. If shareholder power should be increased, shareholder voting
power could be increased in accordingly affirmative or negative directions. If
shareholders’ salient voting preferences are mainly negative in nature, reforms may
be most useful when reinforcing shareholder capacity to enforce those negative
prerogatives without any necessary connection to the ability to effectuate
affirmative preferences.
As a consequence, even if critics of shareholder voting are correct that
shareholders are rationally ignorant, rarely develop specific preferences about what
the company ought affirmatively to do, and prefer management discretion in almost
every matter, a case for shareholder voting reform still emerges. Shareholders may
benefit collectively from stronger veto rights to defend their real and basic negative
preferences. Recent movement toward majority voting rules and shareholder access
to the board nomination process are aimed at shoring up the currently marginal
ability of shareholders to effectuate what can be quite salient negative preferences
against unwanted board candidates.19 Of course, a model of shareholder voting
structured and exercised only as veto is less ambitious than what is typically
contemplated by aspirational democratic theory, but it reflects the basic reality of
shareholder voting and conforms to the cost-benefit calculus of shareholders.
Indeed, structuring shareholder prerogatives in terms of ex post oversight and
negative veto are likely to impose less intrusive interference with centralized
management by the board than affirmative rights of initiation might. Structuring
shareholder voting as veto minimizes the theoretical tradeoff between
accountability and managerial discretion.
The consequences of shareholder voting as veto are simple but useful. First, in
spite of the alleged deficiencies of shareholders as voters, shareholders generally
can be trusted to make sensible veto decisions. Shareholders have the capacity and

18. See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Control of Corporate Decisions:
Shareholders vs. Management, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4115 (2010).
19. See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
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information to make these simpler decisions based largely on variable deference to
management, based on its performance, as a voting cue. As a result, shareholders
do not vote foolishly as a group against strong management in favor of valuereducing measures.20 Instead, they tend to vote conservatively, in favor of
management proposals and board nominees, and against shareholder proposals, just
as critics of shareholder voting would commend.21 What is more, when
shareholders vote in favor of shareholder proposals, shareholders tend to vote
predictably for corporate governance proposals that are value enhancing.22
Second, shareholder voting reform should play to the reality of shareholder
voting as veto. That is, shareholder voting reform is on its strongest ground when it
accommodates shareholders’ limited attention and economized approach to voting
as a veto decision in response to management. Under these constraints,
shareholders manage to apply their veto sensibly when they can, but they
sometimes find insufficient opportunity to apply it at all. For instance, the say on
pay provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act require advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation.23 Despite a
great deal of criticism of say on pay, shareholders are likely to perform well in
evaluating executive compensation and less likely to interfere unduly with
corporate management, particularly given that these say on pay votes are merely
advisory.24 Furthermore, shareholders likely would perform sensibly in checking
executive compensation even if the say on pay votes were binding because
shareholders would tend to defer to management except in the most egregious cases
where a check might be useful.25
Third, shareholder voting as veto helps identify a different type of shareholder
voting reform that presents a more complicated case—affirmative rights of
shareholder initiation. Lucian Bebchuk and others advocate the expansion of
shareholder prerogatives to permit new affirmative rights of initiation that would
allow shareholders to propose and dictate major corporate actions that have

20. See Mario Schijven & Michael A. Hitt, The Vicarious Wisdom of Crowds: Toward a
Behavioral Perspective on Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements, 33 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 1247 (2012).
21. One empirical study finds that even when shareholders are dissatisfied with firm
governance, “average votes of the poorly performing and poorly governed firms are higher
than 90% across all categories of performance.” Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A.
Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2402 (2009).
22. See John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are Shareholder Proposals All
Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills, 33 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 499, 520 (1998) (“[S]hareholders, rather than being a weak
link in the chain of corporate governance, can and do become active when there is reason to
be concerned about managerial activities.”).
23. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
24. Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay:
Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 1213, 1216 (2012) (finding shareholders generally give “broad support to management
pay packages”). But see Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It
Create Value?, 46 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 299 (2011).
25. See Thomas et al., supra note 24, at 1216.
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traditionally been entrusted to the board’s discretion.26 These rights of initiation can
be distinguished as a break from the usual understanding of shareholder voting as
veto and present different challenges for shareholders and companies. In other
words, at a critical moment in the debate over shareholder voting, this type of
reform may be headed in a wrong direction, when the salience of negative
preferences in shareholder voting suggests the better direction for reform. Unlike
efforts to reinforce the shareholder veto, rights of initiation may require
shareholders to obtain more information and go beyond the limited veto function
that they may prefer. None of this decisively cuts against such proposals, but
understanding shareholder voting as veto helps identify the distinct challenges and
opportunities that rights of initiation present.
Part I presents the basics of shareholder voting in corporate governance and then
describes the problem of rational ignorance by shareholders that limits their
engagement with corporate governance. Part II offers a perspective from political
science for how shareholders might overcome the problem of rational ignorance. It
describes retrospective voting in which voters need not know ex ante specifics
about how to vote, provided they can monitor incumbent officeholders at low cost
and punish them ex post based on their results. Part III explains how retrospective
voting translates to shareholder voting and argues that it helps explain the empirical
evidence describing how shareholders vote. It argues that shareholders generally
defer to management and, as skeptics on shareholder voting argue, appear not to
have real preferences in the typical case. However, shareholders rise up in reaction
to poor performance, develop “negative preferences” against further management
by those incumbents, and vote those preferences by voting against, or vetoing, the
incumbents’ recommendations. Finally, Part IV offers a few directions for
shareholder voting reform based on this model of shareholder voting as veto.
I. SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND RATIONAL IGNORANCE
The primacy of the shareholder franchise is widely understood as a myth in
practice under current law.27 Shareholders of publicly traded companies rarely do
more than rubber-stamp decisions by management, the rhetoric of the Delaware
court notwithstanding.28 However, these reform efforts are vehemently resisted by
corporate law scholars and practitioners wedded to a particular vision of the
“rational, ignorant” shareholder.
A. The Basics of Shareholder Voting
Under American corporate law, shareholders vote on company affairs in two
main instances: they elect the board of directors and vote on proposals by
management and fellow shareholders.29 Shareholder voting occurs predominantly
by proxy in advance of the company’s annual meeting. Shareholders, in response to
the company’s proxy materials, grant a proxy for their shares to vote in a

26.
27.
28.
29.

See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 869–70.
Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 732.
See, e.g., id. at 676.
See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 400.
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designated manner on a slate of candidates for the board and either up or down on a
series of proposals by management and, in certain instances, proposals by other
shareholders.30 Most shareholders of public companies do not appear physically to
vote their shares at the annual meeting, and overwhelmingly, shareholders tend to
vote in accordance with management’s recommendations as specified in the
company’s proxy materials.31
The ability of shareholders to elect the board of directors appears superficially
as an important check on management discretion. In the classic account,
shareholders must delegate management of the company to a centralized group of
professionals.32 Ownership of the company is thus separated from its control.
Shareholders are the residual owners of the company and at least putatively have
interests most tightly aligned with the best long-term interests of the company.33
However, management in the form of the directors and officers of the company
may not be properly aligned with the company. The directors and officers may
wish to promote themselves financially, personally, or professionally at the
shareholders’ expense through excessive salaries, empire building, or many other
means that may not benefit the shareholders over the long run.34 Shareholders as
principals of the company, the argument goes, must exercise discipline over its
management agents through indirect means, the most prominent of which is board
elections.35
The board of directors manages the business and affairs of the company in its
discretion. The board selects and delegates its formal authority to the chief
executive officer and a set of company officers, who in turn manage the company
on an everyday basis under the board’s review and must seek the board’s approval
for major decisions.36 The directors on the board are formally accountable to the
shareholders, in the sense that the shareholders hold the right to elect directors on
an annual basis and, at least in theory, replace directors of whom they disapprove.37
As the Delaware Supreme Court famously explained, “If the stockholders are
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”38
As a practical matter, however, the ability of shareholders to hold directors
accountable is very much limited by the usual fact that only candidates nominated
by the board itself are included in the company’s proxy materials.39 The
combination of federal and state law, at least at the moment, conspire to deny
shareholders access to the company’s proxy materials distributed at company
expense to shareholders in advance of annual board elections.40 Board challengers

30. See id. at 399–400.
31. See id. at 400.
32. See id. at 403.
33. See id.
34. Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 679.
35. See id. at 680.
36. Id. at 679–80.
37. Id. at 680.
38. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
39. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 424–25.
40. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 696.
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cannot force the corporation, which is of course managed by the incumbent board,
to include alternative candidates on the corporate ballot.41 As a result, shareholders
who wish to nominate an alternate candidate for the board, other than the ones
nominated by the incumbent board, must pay for the independent solicitation of
proxies from the shareholders.42 They must pay to have proxy materials mailed to
shareholders, which in most cases is prohibitively expensive and in excess of any
expected financial return from successfully replacing the board, as well as provide
for the legal and administrative costs associated with the proxy filing and challenge
process with the SEC.43 The regular staggering of board elections over several
years multiplies the costs of winning board control by requiring two or more
challenges, a year or more apart.44 Given these expenses of nominating a candidate
without the board’s cooperation, the incumbent board’s nominee is usually the only
candidate for a given board seat.45 Shareholders, therefore, are rarely presented
with more than one candidate per seat even when dissatisfied with that candidate’s
performance.46
The shareholder power to vote on management and shareholder proposals also is
quite limited as a practical matter. Shareholders cannot direct their board to adopt
any particular course of action. Shareholders hold only a reactive right to approve
or reject management decisions.47 This right allows the shareholders a veto right
that blocks management from adopting value-reducing changes without
shareholder agreement, but it vests the board with nearly exclusive agenda-setting
power. As a result, when management refuses to adopt value-enhancing changes
from the status quo, there is no formal mechanism in shareholder voting that
enables shareholders to force the board to consider them or present them for
shareholder approval.
Shareholders have only a limited opportunity for initiating action through the
shareholder proposal process. Under Rule 14a-8, shareholders have the ability to
propose “that the company and/or its board of directors take action” by including a
recommendation or requirement for a shareholder vote at the company annual
meeting.48 However, this ability is severely circumscribed by a number of

41. See id.
42. See generally id. at 688–94 (reviewing obstacles, legal and practical, to shareholder
electoral challenges).
43. See id. at 688 n.21 (citing a study finding that the average cost of a proxy contest
was $368,000).
44. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
887 (2002).
45. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 702 (“Under existing default arrangements,
shareholders do not have any meaningful power to veto candidates put forward by the board
in an uncontested election.”).
46. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759,
1775 (2006) (“These pro-incumbent features combine with the costs of running a proxy
contest to produce a corporate election process that functions essentially only when a
takeover bidder funds a slate to get around a poison pill.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 45–46 (2003).
47. See Bebchuk, supra note 2.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012).
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exceptions that permit the company management to exclude a shareholder proposal.
On the one hand, a shareholder proposal must not deal with “a matter relating to the
company’s ordinary business operations,” but on the other hand, a proposal must
not regard operations that are not “significantly related to the company’s
business.”49 The company management is entitled also to exclude shareholder
proposals that relate to an election for membership on the company’s board of
directors or “directly conflict[] with one of the company’s own proposals to be
submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.”50 As a result, the shareholder
proposal process by design offers a narrow window for shareholder-initiated action.
Of course, shareholders always possess the option of selling their shares if they
are unhappy with corporate performance. Although shareholders have little
effective ability to depose the incumbent board under the current law, dissatisfied
shareholders can simply follow the “Wall Street” rule and sell off their shares.51
Indeed, opponents of shareholder activism argue that this threat of exit imposes a
necessary level of discipline on the board even absent board elections.52 The fear of
shareholders selling off their stakes, and therefore depressing the company’s value
in the capital markets, motivates the board to perform well for fear of losing access
to capital or even a potential takeover. On this extreme end, company
underperformance that leads to depressed share price attracts hostile bidders who
might buy control of the company and fire the incumbent management when they
do.
However, there is an enormous academic debate over how well the capital
markets impose board discipline in the absence of accountability to shareholders
through shareholder voting. Many commentators argue that greater shareholder
input into corporate management is necessary to provide what they see as an utter
absence of institutional accountability of directors and officers.53 These
commentators offer empirical evidence that boards are able to insulate themselves
sufficiently from takeover threats through the use of staggered boards, poison pills,

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 41 (1993) (explaining the Wall Street Rule that
“it is more efficient to sell a particular stock than it is to try to reform the company”). But see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1339–41 (1991) (explaining that opportunity for exit is
limited for indexed and long-term investment strategies).
52. See FRANK H. EASTERBOOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 70–71 (1991); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 607–23.
53. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Bebchuk, supra note 2;
Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 1671 (1985); Elizabeth Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform:
Independence or Democracy?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1; Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and
Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1992); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the
Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53 (2008); Ronald J. Gilson,
The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling
Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982); Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605 (2007).
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and other familiar defenses,54 and to safely engage in activity that does not
maximize shareholder value without fear of sanction from shareholders or
markets.55
The concern about board accountability gained special salience during the
financial crisis in 2008. Highly publicized failures of Lehman Brothers, A.I.G., and
Bear Stearns, among others, precipitated deep worries about how well corporate
boards were managing risk on behalf of shareholder interests and inspired
heightened attention to the lack of functional accountability of directors to
shareholders through board elections.56 Then-SEC chair Mary L. Schapiro noted
that “[t]his crisis has led many to raise serious questions and concerns . . . about
whether Boards are exercising appropriate oversight of management, whether
Boards are appropriately focused on shareholder interests and whether Boards need
to be more accountable for their decisions . . . .”57 Indeed, in April 2009, the State
of Delaware had already beat the SEC to the punch and amended its corporate code
to make it easier for shareholders to nominate director candidates. Delaware law
changed to permit, but not require, Delaware corporations to adopt bylaws that
authorize shareholders under certain circumstances to include board nominees in
the company proxy materials and that allow the company to reimburse shareholders
for the expense of an independent proxy solicitation.58
Shortly after Delaware’s reforms, the SEC released new proposed rules that also
would have amended the federal proxy rules and made it easier under certain
circumstances for shareholders to nominate a candidate for a company’s board of
directors.59 New Rule 14a-11 would have required a company to include in the
company’s proxy materials a board candidate nominated by a shareholder who
owns—subject to certain conditions—at least 3% of the company’s securities
entitled to vote on the election of directors.60 The amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
proposed relaxation of the “election exclusion” such that a company would not be

54. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Bebchuk et al., supra
note 44; Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1795 (2002).
55. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski & Robert Parrino, CEO
Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495 (1997); Gerald T. Garvey &
Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover
Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J. FIN. 519 (1999); Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew
Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
56. See, e.g., JOHN GILLESPIE & DAVID ZWEIG, MONEY FOR NOTHING: HOW THE FAILURE
OF CORPORATE BOARDS IS RUINING AMERICAN BUSINESS AND COSTING US TRILLIONS (2010).
57. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting on Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009). Of course, putting aside the political
dynamics, there is great question whether increased opportunities for shareholder activism
would have prevented the recent financial failures. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11.
58. H.B. 19, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009).
59. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June
10, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 & 274).
60. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,787–88
(Sept. 16, 2010) (adopted Aug. 25, 2010), vacated in part by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This ownership threshold was later reduced from 5% to 3%. Id.
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permitted to exclude a shareholder’s proposal and supporting statement in its proxy
materials to amend the company’s nomination procedures or disclosures with
respect to shareholder nominations.61 Together, these proposed rules allowed
greater shareholder access to the company’s proxy materials with respect to board
nominations and greater shareholder ability to fight off company attempts to
disallow such access.
The SEC presented its proposals as necessary for board accountability to
shareholders. As Schapiro explained, the SEC intended these proposed rules to
“turn what would otherwise be a somewhat illusory right to nominate into
something that is real—and has a real chance of holding boards of directors
accountable to company owners.”62 Shareholders who own a nontrivial stake in a
company would have had the right under the proposed new Rule 14a-11 to include
board nominees in the company proxy materials and need not have incurred the
costs of a separate proxy solicitation.63 New Rule 14a-11 would have dramatically
reduced the cost of challenging incumbent directors and therefore would have
introduced new competition to what were usually noncompetitive elections. The
SEC’s proposals followed two attempts during the previous six years to change the
proxy rules,64 but they were not implemented because of a successful legal
challenge by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable.65 The
future of proxy access is therefore still very much up in the air.
The federal government has acted with respect to say on pay reform. Say on pay
is a corporate governance measure that requires a nonbinding advisory vote by
shareholders on a company’s executive compensation.66 Although say on pay has

61. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic
Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165 (2007) (describing the politics of
Rule 14a-8 leading to the SEC proposal).
62. Schapiro, supra note 57.
63. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240 and 249).
64. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg.
43,488 (proposed July 27, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Security Holder
Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 14, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 & 274). In 2003, the SEC also proposed inclusion in the company’s
proxy materials of shareholder nominees for the board, but conditional on the previous
occurrence of certain triggering events that suggested shareholder dissatisfaction with the
board. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003);
see also Strine, supra note 46, at 1778–82 (proposing that qualified shareholders of public
companies be allowed periodically to add slates of director candidates to the company proxy
card). Shareholders could include director nominees only if 35% of shareholder votes cast
were withheld from one or more of the company’s nominees in the previous two years or if a
shareholder proposal endorsing proxy access received majority shareholder support during
the previous two years. The SEC abandoned its 2003 effort when the Commission could not
reach agreement on how to proceed, and a later 2007 effort that resembles the 2009
proposals also was abandoned under similar circumstances. See Carolyn M. Check &
Michael R. Miller, Empirical Study, Determining Shareholder Access: Examining
Shareholder-Management Relationships Through the Differing Lenses Used by the SEC and
the “Common Law” of Corporate Bylaws, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297, 297–303 (2009)
(describing these developments).
65. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
66. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
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been suggested for years, it was implemented in the United States on a
comprehensive basis only recently as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act.67 The say on pay provisions of Dodd-Frank require
that at least once every three years, every public reporting company under the 1934
Act must include in its proxy statement a nonbinding resolution subject to a
shareholder approval on the compensation of the named executive officers as
disclosed in the company’s annual report.68 The theory of say on pay was to
interject a requirement of shareholder consent, albeit nonbinding, into company
decision making about escalating executive compensation.
Shareholders also have pushed for voting reform with increasing success when it
comes to majority voting rules. Although corporate law before the 1980s typically
required a majority vote for election of a director to the board, Delaware and most
states now require only that a board nominee receive a plurality of shareholder
votes for election to the board, notwithstanding abstentions or withheld votes.69 As
a result, if the incumbent board nominates only one candidate, that candidate’s
election is a fait accompli with nothing more than a single vote. The barriers to
candidate nomination, combined with the plurality rule, conspire to assure the
incumbent board’s preferred result—typically the reelection of incumbent
directors—and quash all electoral pressure in all but the rarest, costliest
circumstances. But large institutional investors, such as the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), have pressured companies to adopt
majority voting rules for board elections.70 Under a majority voting rule, even an
uncontested candidate for the board must receive at least a majority of the
shareholder votes cast to gain or retain a board seat.
Given the difficulty of challenging the board’s nominees, institutional investors
argued that a majority voting rule is necessary in uncontested elections to ensure
that unhappy shareholders are able to veto the election of disfavored candidates.71
In 2005, Pfizer Inc. led the way in requiring that a director who fails to receive a
majority of shareholder votes resign from the board.72 By 2009, roughly two-thirds
of the companies comprising the S&P 500 had adopted some form of majority

203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
67. Id.
68. Securities and Exchange Act § 14A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (Supp. 2012).
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2011) (“Directors shall be elected by a plurality of
the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled
to vote on the election of directors . . . .”); COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, ABA SECTION
OF BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS ON VOTING BY
SHAREHOLDERS FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 6 (2006) (reporting that thirty-five
jurisdictions provide expressly that directors be elected by plurality vote).
70. See, e.g., Press Release, CalPERS, Graco Shareowners Back CalPERS Proposal for
Majority Vote in Board Elections (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2012/april/graco-backs-calpers.xml.
71. See generally Jay Razzouk, The Momentum, Motive, and Mouse-Kapades of the
Majority Vote Movement, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 391 (2008) (discussing the
“majority vote movement” in corporate law).
72. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on
the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 6 (2008).
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voting for board elections,73 leading one leading practice guide to conclude recently
that “[i]t is clear today that majority voting will become universal.”74
It is no surprise that institutional investors are leading the charge on majority
voting rules and other governance reforms.75 Institutional investors now own
roughly two-thirds of the outstanding shares of public equity, compared to less than
10% in 1950.76 Just as importantly, a number of institutional investors, including
CalPERS, have become increasingly activist in publicly campaigning against board
decisions, engaging in proxy fights, and pressing for a greater role for shareholders
in corporate governance.77 These groups have been influential in not only the
widespread adoption of majority voting rules, but also efforts on shareholder access
to the proxy ballot, elimination of staggered boards, and executive compensation.78
What is more, these groups have successfully coordinated their efforts with one
another with the help of entities such as Institutional Shareholder Services, which
acts as an advisory service among institutional investors on shareholder concerns.79
In short, academic and political debate over the proper measure of shareholder
influence through shareholder voting, and the shape it should take, is hotly
contested. Advocates for greater shareholder influence have gained a great deal of
ground against traditional resistance, with majority voting rules perhaps only an
early sign of several reforms to follow. As Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock observe,
“[n]ever has voting been more important in corporate law.”80
B. The Rationally Ignorant Shareholder
As a general matter, the debate over shareholder voting in corporate law centers
on the amount of control shareholders should exercise over directors. As Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means set out the basic problem of corporate law, shareholders
are the residual owners of the corporation, but as a large, diffuse group beset by
collective action problems, shareholders of public corporations delegate and
centralize management authority under corporate law to a board of directors.81 This

73. Jay Cai, Jacqueline Garner & Ralph Walkling, Democracy or Disruption: An
Empirical Analysis of Majority Elections for Directors 5 n.7, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491627.
74. James Cole, Jr. & Igor Kirman, Takeover Law and Practice, in DOING DEALS:
UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS & BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 11, 37 (2008). But cf.
William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors,
40 CONN. L. REV. 459 (2007) (arguing that majority voting rules do not shift power to
shareholders).
75. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Coffee, supra note 51 (discussing
the greater monitoring incentives for institutional investors).
76. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2008).
77. Id. at 1276.
78. See Fairfax, supra note 72, at 5–12.
79. International
Shareholder
Services,
Proxy
Voting
Services,
ISS,
http://www.issgovernance.com/proxy/voting.
80. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1227, 1229 (2008).
81. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
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separation of ownership and control of the company, between shareholders and the
board, poses a principal-agent problem for which shareholder voting is one
solution.82 Corporate law sets the balance between accountability and authority for
the board, and as Stephen Bainbridge puts it, “[e]stablishing the proper mix of
discretion and accountability thus emerges as the central corporate governance
question.”83
Many corporate law scholars, as well as corporate law practitioners, argue that
this balance should always be set in favor of authority for the board, rather than
accountability through shareholder voting. They argue that accountability to
shareholders, at least any greater accountability than currently provided by
corporate law, would be counterproductive because of the inherent challenges of
collective decision making that beset shareholders of large, publicly traded
companies.84 At least for such public companies with dispersed ownership, it is
highly unlikely that the multiplicity of shareholders will remain well informed
about the company’s affairs and then achieve collective agreement on the best
course of action for their company.85
First, the high costs of information and coordination quickly outweigh the pro
rata benefits a single shareholder will receive as a function of her ownership stake.
Any shareholder must invest real resources into monitoring the company’s
operations and business, as well as developing a plan for future action. Determining
the best course of action for a public company in a complex, international economy
filled with contingency is difficult to achieve from outside the unique position and
information of company management. Particularly for investors in public
corporations with dispersed ownership, it does not usually make economic sense to
develop an affirmative agenda for the corporation when the directors and officers of
the corporation have better information and more resources to do so on an ongoing
basis. What is more, any benefits that the company realizes from following the
shareholder’s designs would accrue to the shareholder on only a pro rata basis,
proportionate to her shareholdings, while the costs would be borne entirely by
herself. As a result, Bainbridge argues that shareholders quite naturally become
“rationally apathetic.”86
Second, even if shareholders decided against economic interest to remain well
informed about their companies, shareholders as a large group face classic
collective action problems. The large size of any shareholder group complicates its
ability to achieve consensus about even simple decisions. As the number of
shareholders increases, the diversity of interests, expertise, and information among
shareholders also increases, as does then the diversity of their preferences with
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed., Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
82. The reference to ownership here can be misleading. To be more precise,
shareholders own only securities in the corporation, which carry with them a legally defined
set of rights that may or may not track one’s colloquial sensibility about what ownership
entails. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190–92 (2002). However, I adopt the terminology of Berle and Means
in their presentation of the basic relationship between shareholders and the board.
83. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 626.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2006).
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respect to the company. What is more, as the number of shareholders increases, so
too do the basic challenges of communication and coordination among the group.
For all these reasons, Bainbridge concludes that “at the most basic level, the
mechanical difficulties of achieving consensus among thousands of decisionmakers impede shareholders from taking an active role.”87
By contrast, management by the board places centralized control in a small,
specialized group armed with the best information about the corporation’s
performance, opportunities, and best interests over the long run.88 Bainbridge
explains that “[t]he chief economic virtue of the public corporation is . . . that it
provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, managers,
shareholders, creditors, and other inputs.”89 In the view of Bainbridge and other
opponents of shareholder activism, “directors cannot be held accountable without
undermining their discretionary authority.”90 Reforms that would increase board
accountability to the shareholders also necessarily threaten the critical benefits of
centralized discretion in the board. Opponents of reforms such as the Rule 14a-11
amendments and majority voting requirements argue that centralized corporate
management by directors and officers of the public corporation is critical to
American corporate success.91 In their view, rather than assume the costs of
managing the company for themselves, shareholders are better off delegating
management ex ante and simply selling their stakes in companies if company
performance is bad.92
Based on these concerns, critics of shareholder voting oppose expansion of
shareholder influence through shareholder voting and the proxy process.93 The
insulation of management from shareholder influence allows the board to act with
centralized authority in the best interests of the company without the irrational or

87. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 622.
88. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director
Primacy]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
89. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 626.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 7.
92. Shareholders dissatisfied with management of a corporation may have little direct
means to exercise “voice” within corporate management, but they can exercise “exit” and
leave their troubles behind by simply selling their shares. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 5,
at 619 (reciting the Wall Street Rule). However, the opportunity for exit may be less for
certain institutional investors. See Coffee, supra note 51, at 1339–41 (arguing that
opportunity for exit is limited because approximately one-third of equity investments are
indexed and represent long-term holdings that cannot be shed). In addition, the opportunity
for voice may be greater for large institutional investors. See Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 874–
76 (1992); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).
93. See, e.g., Joshua R. Mourning, Note, The Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing
Shareholder Disenfranchisement in Corporate Director Elections, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1143, 1174–81 (2007) (discussing arguments against majority voting).
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narrowly self-interested pressures from shareholders. Bainbridge argues that “the
substantial efficiency benefits that follow from the separation of ownership and
control justify retaining the current regime of limited shareholder voting rights as,
at the very least, the default rule.”94 Lynn Stout similarly criticizes recent calls for
shareholder voting reform as ignorant of the need for management discretion and
simply “driven by sentiment and the unspoken assumption that shareholder
democracy, like Mom and apple pie, must be a good thing.”95 Bainbridge, Stout,
and others, in other words, approve of the status quo in shareholder voting. The
status quo offers strict limitations on shareholder influence and therefore preserves
the broad managerial discretion that they so value.96
II. VOTING AS VETO AND RATIONAL IGNORANCE
The standard critique of shareholder voting draws strength from the notion that
shareholders are rationally ignorant about the affirmative management of the
company, are content to defer to the board, and therefore add no value in actively
participating in corporate governance.97 However, shareholders need not satisfy the
informational and coordination requirements described by critics of shareholder
voting. In fact, voters in other contexts engage effectively in what I describe here as
retrospective voting despite similar constraints on information and coordination.
Corporate scholars and practitioners are correct to argue that shareholders of
public companies generally do not have well-developed affirmative preferences
about the management of those companies. That is, average shareholders of major
public corporations generally do not possess particular designs for the company’s
best course of action, nor may they want to consider and invest in developing a
sense of such.98 Shareholders, as Bainbridge and others explain, tend to be
rationally ignorant regarding the optimal course of action for a corporation because

94. Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 1758.
95. Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789,
809 (2007).
96. Critics of shareholder voting struggle to explain why shareholder voting exists at all.
They generally believe that efficient markets dictate and therefore justify the status quo on
efficiency grounds. The efficiency of the market, in their view, demonstrates that
shareholders do not demand a high level of control over management, or else they would
insist on more through the market before investing in a company. But on these very terms, it
is difficult for these critics of shareholder voting to explain the universality of shareholder
voting in corporate governance given that they have little good to say about shareholders
voting at all, given their concerns.
97. See Bainbridge, supra note 5.
98. See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L.
REV. 733, 742 (2007) (arguing that there is “no market demand for the ‘franchise reform’
Bebchuk advocates”); Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian
Moment: A Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 139, 165 (2009) (doubting that shareholders would seek to “micromanage ordinary
business decisions in large public corporations”); see also Thompson & Edelman, supra note
11, at 130 (“Shareholders seldom seem to care much about the vote even when they have it,
usually preferring the ‘Wall Street rule’ (i.e., sell) when they disagree with a decision made
by the corporation’s managers.”).
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the information costs are extremely high and the pro rata benefits unlikely to be
commensurate.99
However, shareholders as voters are little different in this sense than voters in
many other contexts. Citizens voting in government elections and choosing among
candidates for public office face almost the identical calculus of rational ignorance.
The cost of information for citizen voters is high, ranging across many government
issues of immense complexity, and the average individual payoff from a voter’s
preferred outcome is terribly small. Indeed, the material incentive for an individual
voter to attend to her vote in government election may be lower on average than in
shareholder elections for public companies. Unlike the general rule of one vote per
share in shareholder voting, each citizen in the typical government election is
constitutionally limited to only one vote per election, which means that the
likelihood any individual citizen’s vote choice will be decisive and therefore matter
at all is negligible for all practical considerations.
Voting in government elections nonetheless effectively translates public
preferences. Voters manage to overcome rational ignorance by developing certain
shortcuts for generating rational voting preferences that map their interests and
voting those preferences in elections. Accounts of retrospective voting, as
articulated by Morris Fiorina and others, explain that voters need not develop
deeply informed opinions about specific issues and candidates’ stances on them.100
Instead, voters can keep a running tally of retrospective evaluations of the parties’
performances and promises, and then apply the running tally as a basic voting
guide for or against candidates of those parties. Even more simply, retrospective
voters may simply assess the state of the country as a proxy for the incumbent’s
performance and then vote accordingly for or against the incumbent based on that
assessment.101 Although this type of retrospective voting may fail deliberative
ideals about civic engagement and voting, it enables rationally ignorant voters to
know enough to identify how they should vote and to protect their interests by
voting out unsatisfactory officeholders.
Models of retrospective voting are voters’ creative response to the problem of
rational ignorance. As Fiorina explains, even uninformed voters “typically have
one comparatively hard bit of data: they know what life has been like during the
incumbent’s administration.”102 This bit of data about incumbent performance
serves as a useful information shortcut about the how the voters should vote in the

99. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 623–24; K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting
and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1472–76;
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 402–03. It is important to acknowledge, however,
the increasing concentration of shareholding in public companies into the hands of
institutional investors for whom the calculus tilts further in the direction of activism than for
the average retail investor. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities
Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1961–64 (2010) (describing this trend); see supra
notes 75–79 and accompanying text (describing the different incentives for institutional
investors).
100. See FIORINA, supra note 10.
101. See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, Economic Retrospective Voting in American National
Elections: A Micro-Analysis, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 426 (1978); Kinder & Kiewiet, supra note
10; Markus, supra note 10.
102. FIORINA, supra note 10, at 5.
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coming election. Voters can hold the incumbent accountable for her performance
ex post through their next vote and thereby induce the right incentives ex ante for
the incumbent without collecting the necessary information to make a fully
informed decision at the beginning. In this view, voters care more about results
than the specific policies used to reach those results.103 When things are going well,
voters are likely to keep the incumbent in office as a default choice without
knowing much about policy specifics, but when things are going poorly, voters can
drop their usual deference to the incumbent and replace her.
One consequence of retrospective voting is that elections often are effectively a
referendum on the incumbent’s performance, particularly when the incumbent is in
the race. To give one salient example, the 1984 presidential election was almost
entirely a referendum on voters’ feelings about incumbent President Ronald
Reagan.104 Almost all surveyed respondents who voted for President Reagan
explained that they voted primarily for him, rather than against the challenger
Walter Mondale. However, almost half of the surveyed respondents who voted for
Mondale explained that they were voting against Reagan instead of primarily in
support of Mondale. The challenger Mondale was largely a standby alternative to
be considered only by voters dissatisfied by the incumbent as a threshold matter.
This type of incumbent-based shortcut for voters generalizes far beyond the 1984
presidential elections to help explain election outcomes based on voter perceptions
of incumbent performance, usually based on economic conditions, in the United
States at both the national and state level.105
Even further, voters defer to the incumbent’s recommendations when the
incumbent is seen as performing well. Voters economize not just in their election
choices among candidates, but also in their decisions on specific policy questions
put to them on the ballot. In direct democracy, voters face the same daunting
informational challenges that they do for candidate elections, and they opt for a
similar strategy of heuristic voting in deciding how to vote on a specific ballot
question over public policy. When the incumbent is performing well, voters defer
to the incumbent’s endorsement and take her cue on how to vote on specific ballot
questions.106 Of course, this type of heuristic voting makes basic sense for
rationally ignorant voters. They defer to the more informed judgment of an
incumbent who has earned their trust by way of past performance and deviate from

103. Id. at 8.
104. See generally Lee Sigelman & Michael M. Gant, Anticandidate Voting in the 1984
Presidential Election, 11 POL. BEHAV. 81 (1989).
105. See generally James D. King, Incumbent Popularity and Vote Choice in
Gubernatorial Elections, 63 J. POL. 585 (2001); Patrick J. Kenney & Tom W. Rice,
Popularity and the Vote: The Gubernatorial Case, 11 AM. POL. Q. 237 (1983); Susan E.
Howell & James M. Vanderleeuw, Economic Effects on State Governors, 18 AM. POL. Q.
158 (1990); Robert C. Lowry, James E. Alt & Karen E. Ferree, Fiscal Policy Outcomes and
Electoral Accountability in American States, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 759 (1998).
106. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative
Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 149
(Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds., 1998); David M. Paul & Clyde
Brown, The Dynamics of Elite Endorsements in Professional Sports Facility Referendums, 6
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 272 (2006); Lee Sigelman, Voting in Gubernatorial Succession
Referenda: The Incumbency Cue, 51 J. POL. 869 (1989).

1318

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1299

the incumbent’s judgment mainly when past performance no longer inspires the
same confidence. Voters execute the basic strategy of deferring to incumbent
officeholders, both in returning them to office and in voting for their policy
recommendations, when they appear to be doing a good job.
Just like retrospective voters in government elections, shareholders generally
defer to incumbents in office. In shareholder voting on management’s board
nominees, major transactions, and management proposals, shareholders
overwhelmingly tend to defer by voting to approve management’s direction.107 For
shareholder proposals, shareholders again defer overwhelmingly to management’s
position and vote against such proposals consistent with management direction.108
This general deference to the board, coupled with the institutional advantage of
management, means that board-nominated candidates for director and proposals
from management tend overwhelmingly to win approval from shareholders, just as
management recommends.109 Without knowing much detail about the company,
shareholders defer in the usual course to management.
However, this deference can be overcome when company performance is
disappointing. Despite rational ignorance on details, shareholders are excellently
positioned to monitor company performance because “they are uniquely sensitive
to the principal signal indicating a deviation of the board from its duty to the
corporation: the market price of the corporation’s stock.”110 When company
performance is disappointing, shareholders appear to use company performance as
a proxy for management performance and punish management accordingly.111 For
instance, when company performance lags by objective measures, shareholders
become less deferential to management and are more likely to vote for a
shareholder proposal against management’s recommendation.112 Deference appears
to wane in particular when a trusted institutional investor takes the lead and
advocates the passage of a shareholder proposal against management’s
recommendation.113
Shareholder voting in these basic respects resembles models of heuristic voting
from political science. Identification of an affirmative preference for the
corporation in terms of corporate strategy may require new information and
consideration of all feasible alternatives that voters simply may not care enough to
engage. However, shareholders need far less information to monitor management

107. See Bainbridge, supra note 5.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 11, at 149.
111. See infra Part III.
112. See, e.g., James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations
and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010) (documenting how
shareholders vote against management recommendations to a much greater degree when
proxy voting advisory firm ISS Corporate Governance Services advises so); Randall S.
Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder
Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 371 (2007) (reporting
increasing shareholder support for shareholder proposals that would remove anti-takeover
devices).
113. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 571–72 (1990).
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and apply certain negative preferences against management when appropriate.
Shareholders need not develop costly affirmative preferences about company
affairs by keeping informed about the details of the corporation’s business
operations and specific management decisions.114 Instead, they simply maintain a
standing opinion about management and the company’s overall performance under
its control, which serves as a heuristic for shareholders’ voting judgments.
Shareholders shake out of their general deference to management when their
retrospective assessment of the management’s performance is negative.
This negative, retrospective model of voting also helps ease problems of
collective action among voters. Rather than purporting to identify a single
affirmative preference among many shareholders, shareholder voting might be best
structured to track a more modest objective—vetoing only those choices that are
unacceptable to an overlapping consensus among those shareholders. Not only can
shareholders overcome the cost of information for important questions of negative
preference, consensus among shareholders is easier when framed as a question of
negative preference. Shareholder voting, even with a large number of shareholders,
need not dissolve into an Arrovian voting paradox that many critics of shareholder
voting imagine.
Indeed, certain classic treatments of democratic theory and public choice
contend that elections can establish accountability only through such negative,
retrospective accounts of voting. Joseph Schumpeter identified in his critique of
democracy the same problems of rational ignorance and collective action that
critics of shareholder voting allege, claiming that the average citizen is “a member
of an unworkable committee, the committee of the whole nation, and this is why he
expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political problem than he expends on
a game of bridge.”115 As a consequence, it was impossible to speak of officeholders
carrying out an affirmative popular will, which required far greater motivation and
coordination among average citizens than practiced democracy could support.
Schumpeter, and later William Riker, along similar lines, thus challenged what they
saw as this “populist” understanding of democracy that set its goals as the
realization of voters’ affirmative preferences through voting and elections.116
However, Schumpeter and Riker did not dismiss voting and democracy as
unworkable. Instead, they argued that democratic government does not collapse,
despite the problems of rational ignorance and collective action, because the mass
public readily accepts elected incumbents and generally defers to its leadership.117
Voting and democracy provide accountability in a much more limited but important
sense than in the populist understanding. Voting produces accountability in the

114. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 624 (explaining that the market is a reliable
indicator of performance and that to gauge management performance, “[a]n occasional
glance at the stock market listings in the newspaper is all that is required”).
115. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 261 (3d ed.
1950).
116. See id. at 250–64 (criticizing the “classical doctrine” of democracy); Michael S.
Kang, Voting as Veto, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1228 n.11 (2010) (noting Riker’s populist
interpretation of democracy and citing predecessors).
117. SCHUMPETER, supra note 115; WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM
(1982).
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public’s conditional, intermittent power to end the incumbents’ reign. As William
Riker put it in his similar critique, “[l]iberal democracy is simply the veto by which
it is sometimes possible to restrain official tyranny.”118
Along related lines, I argue in recent work that positive and normative
conceptions of voting are fixated on affirmative preferences and neglectful of these
negative preferences.119 The most familiar voting tool for effectuating negative
preferences is the formal right of unilateral veto, where one voter can block a
particular alternative from winning approval. But collective voting can be oriented
to aggregate negative preferences of many voters and decide by election what
choices will not be made. Under this reversal of the usual assumptions, voting
offers no guarantee that the electorate’s most preferred choice will be selected or
realized, but instead, voting is designed to block the electorate’s least or lesser
preferred outcomes from coming to pass.
In fact, voters often subjectively care more about vetoing unwanted outcomes
than they care about achieving their most desired outcomes. Voters at times have
less idea about what they most prefer, in terms of affirmative preferences, than
what they do not want and would veto if they had the chance.120 Indeed, a wide
body of research from psychology finds that people place greater value,
importance, and weight on events that have negative, rather than positive,
consequences for them.121 As a cognitive matter, people appear to decide upon their
negative preferences before their affirmative preferences and rely upon them more
heavily to reach all types of decisions.122 Voters within a particular context
therefore may be sensibly efficient to satisfice and focus mainly on fulfilling their
negative preferences rather than developing clear affirmative preferences.
Voters’ negative preferences, such as anticandidate feelings, are often the most
salient, intensely held preferences that voters hold at all in a particular voting

118. RIKER, supra note 117, at 244.
119. Kang, supra note 116.
120. Stancil v. Bruce Stancil Refrigeration, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986),
offers a humorous example of negative preferences in shareholder voting. The case featured
a woeful misunderstanding of cumulative voting by the plaintiff shareholder and his
attorneys. Although the defendant and plaintiff shareholders each owned the same number of
shares, the plaintiff failed to vote his shares cumulatively. His error allowed the defendant to
take over the company as a practical matter. On appeal, the plaintiff inventively claimed that
he wished to vote his shares negatively. The plaintiff wanted not to vote for his own
nominees, but instead to vote against the defendant shareholder’s nominees and cancel out
the defendant shareholder’s votes for those nominees. The company’s bylaws appeared not
to have accounted for such negative preferences, nor did the Stancil court seem eager to
explore the validity of the plaintiff’s negative preferences. It is interesting to note that
nothing in state law expressly prohibited a corporation from permitting vote by negative
preference if the corporation so provides, such as sequential vetoes until the remaining
nominees matched the number of seats to be filled.
121. See Kang, supra note 116, at 1229–31 (discussing research from psychology on
negativity bias).
122. Amrisha Vaish, Tobias Grossmann & Amanda Woodward, Not All Emotions Are
Created Equal: The Negativity Bias in Social-Emotional Development, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL.
383, 383 (2008). See generally Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer &
Kathleen D. Vohs, Bad Is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323, 362 (2001)
(summarizing a review of the literature).

2013]

SHAREHOLDER VOTING AS VETO

1321

context.123 Voters in a political election, for instance, may care much more about
ensuring the defeat of a particular candidate, or type of candidate, than they care
about the individual victory of their most preferred candidate.124 Voters may care
little in particular about most judicial races, content to reelect or retain almost all
incumbents, but nonetheless may have very intense negative preferences against
certain judges who become individually controversial or salient.125 Along the same
lines, rationally ignorant shareholders, who know little about the specifics of the
company’s business or what specifically the company ought to change, can develop
clear negative preferences against poorly performing management and act on those
preferences in shareholder voting.
This negative conception of voting as veto is actually more familiar than it
might initially seem across many different voting contexts. As I document
elsewhere, voting systems from contemporary run-off elections to the ancient
Greek practice of ostracism have been oriented to recognize mainly negative,
oppositional preferences of voters.126 Even in voting systems that are not so clearly
designed to track negative preferences, negative preferences still decide voting
behavior on a regular basis. Indeed, in some contexts, negative preferences may be
the only meaningful preferences that voters hold. Voters in judicial retention
elections, for example, appear to vote almost unthinkingly to retain as a default,
with very little information about individual judges, except that they occasionally
vote very real negative preferences about particular judges whose performances
become publicly controversial.127
Of course, adopting an explicitly negative orientation for voting as veto makes
much less sense in certain voting contexts. Public elections are often hoped to be
collective participatory processes that foster collective affiliation, community
bonding, and civic efficacy. Orienting voters to think and vote negatively against
their least preferred choices, instead of mobilizing behind a most affirmatively
preferred candidate, diminishes these positive qualities of public elections and
directs public affairs instead in negative directions. What is more, a focus on
negative preferences can be socially disruptive when voters are required to identify
their least preferred choices and vetoed candidates may carry a particular stigma
from being chosen as the worst alternative among the eligible. Voting as veto and
formal recognition of negative preferences, instead of affirmative ones, does not
always make sense.
However, the costs of orienting voting toward negative preferences are not
likely to be worrisome in the context of corporate shareholder voting. The
aspirational expectations of public elections are simply absent for shareholder
voting because it tends to be so focused narrowly on instrumental concerns about

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Kang, supra note 116, at 1229.
See id. at 1246–49 (discussing anticandidate voting in political elections).
See id. at 1243–44 (discussing low-intensity judicial races as an example).
See id. at 1232–40.
See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2071 n.88 (2010); George W. Soule, Judicial Elections 2010, BENCH
& B. MINN., Jan. 2011, at 28, 31–32.
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company value.128 In addition, social disruption among shareholders and
management is not a significant concern in large public corporations where
shareholders and management have little personal contact, and a certain level of
disagreement is untroubling between shareholders and management.
To a significant degree, corporate shareholder voting follows the same pattern as
negative, retrospective voting in other contexts. The rational ignorance of
shareholders does not necessarily doom the development of negative preferences
which voting can be structured to recognize. Shareholders may thus have an
incomplete set of preferences but still have salient preferences about the worst-case
scenarios.129 Shareholders who generally would defer to management when things
are going well might still hold very negative preferences against management’s
direction once the company performs poorly over time. Shareholders need not
understand everything to know how they feel about a few things, particularly when
company performance is bad.
III. VOTING AS VETO IN SHAREHOLDER VOTING
Shareholders passively defer to management direction an overwhelming portion
of the time, but at the same time, they can monitor company performance at low
cost and punish management when they perceive the company to be managed
poorly. Shareholders who regularly defer to management when the company is
performing well, and appear not to have real preferences about company direction,
can develop negative preferences against management when the company performs
poorly and act on those very real preferences through shareholder voting. This
understanding of how shareholder voting works in practice suggests why
shareholder voting works where it does and guides shareholder-voting reform
positively toward the realities of how shareholders vote.
A. The Structure of the Shareholder Veto
Under current American corporate law, whatever influence shareholders
exercise over the company’s affairs can be understood as structured mainly in terms
of negative rights. There is little pretense of shareholder rights of affirmative
initiation in corporate management. As Lucian Bebchuk summarizes, a “central and
well-settled principle of U.S. corporate law is that all major corporate decisions
must be initiated by the board [of directors].”130 The board, and corporate officers
subordinate to the board, manages corporate affairs without shareholder discretion
or affirmative authority to command particular action. Besides the ability to vote on
election of directors to the board, shareholders possess only limited rights to deny
action on fundamental matters of corporate policy proposed by the officers and

128. See, e.g., Donald J. Smythe, Shareholder Democracy and the Economic Purpose of
the Corporation, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407 (2006) (describing the historical shift in
shareholder voting to a focus on economics).
129. See Kang, supra note 116, at 1242–45 (discussing negative preferences as
incomplete preferences in the face of limited information).
130. Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 836.
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directors of the company.131 The requirement of shareholder approval for certain
corporate actions effectively constitutes at best a shareholder veto with respect to a
limited set of actions.
This legal structure, as it currently stands, is tailored to shareholders’ rational
ignorance. The limited category of questions presented for a vote to shareholders, at
least for publicly traded companies, effectively binds the range of issues that
shareholders need to consider. Most of these decisions are presented to
shareholders for a vote as a binary choice—shareholders either vote for or against
candidates for the board, for or against shareholder proposals or corporate
transactions, for or against the appointment of auditors, and so on. This structure
accommodates the fact that shareholders are a collective “whose vocabulary is
limited to two words, ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’”132 The narrow framing of both the types of
decisions presented to shareholders and the range of alternatives offered on those
decisions limits the challenges of collective choice.133
Opponents of shareholder activism, such as Bainbridge, argue that extension of
shareholder voting under current reform proposals would interfere with the board
and management’s centralized operation of the company. In Bainbridge’s view, for
instance, “directors cannot be held accountable without undermining their
discretionary authority.”134 Most proposals for shareholder reform provide stronger
ex post oversight rather than ex ante control over management decisions, but
Bainbridge argues that this distinction is one in form only because “giving
investors this power of review differs little from giving them the power to make
management decisions in the first place.”135 In his view, there is a zero-sum
distribution of power between shareholders and the board along a single
continuum—any serious reform that gives stronger oversight to shareholders
threatens in equal measure to undermine the critical value of centralized
management discretion.136 For this reason, Bainbridge concludes that “[t]here ought
to be a rebuttable presumption in favor of preservation of managerial discretion.”137
Underlying such a presumption must be a faith that current law strikes a
reasonably efficient balance between accountability and managerial discretion. Of
course, ignoring any tradeoff between accountability and managerial discretion and
single-mindedly maximizing shareholder accountability without considering the
reduction in managerial discretion would be a mistake. None of the current reform
proposals, however, come close to doing so. As one commentator explains, current

131. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 400.
132. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 52 (1942).
133. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 364 (1991) (“If the ‘policy
space’ of shareholder choice has only a single dimension, cycling would be relatively rare,
assuming shareholders voted rationally.”); Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s
Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217 (2009) (arguing
that corporate scholars overestimate the likelihood of preference cycling in shareholder
voting).
134. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 626.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 113 (2008).
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proposals operate in a middle ground and are “reform[s] in favor of somewhat more
accountability at the expense of some, but far from a total, loss in authority.”138 The
relevant question is the identification of the most efficient balance between the
values of accountability and managerial discretion and how well current law and
reform proposals approach that optimal balance.
On this question, current law fares only so well under the empirical research to
date. A rich body of work suggests that the balance set by current law is too far in
favor of managerial discretion, at the expense of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and
Jesse Fried, for instance, argue that excessive discretion, and lack of accountability
to shareholders, on the part of management helps explain the extremely high levels
of executive compensation relative to that in other industrialized countries.139
Bebchuk, in other work with Guhan Subramanian and John Coates, finds staggered
board arrangements—which make it more difficult to replace the incumbent
board—depress shareholder value by increasing the likelihood that company
management is insulated against hostile bids for control.140 Nonetheless, more than
two-thirds of companies whose shareholders had passed precatory resolutions to
repeal their respective company’s staggered board arrangement from 1997 to 2003
had not repealed their staggered board.141 In other words, a comfortable majority of
companies whose shareholders voted to repeal staggered boards had defied their
shareholders by retaining a feature of corporate governance that insulates
management and thereby depresses shareholder value. It is far from obvious that
current law sets the right balance between accountability and managerial discretion
when managers exercise not only centralized authority, as prescribed by Bainbridge
and others, but also enjoy such deep insulation from shareholders.
However, an emphasis on shareholders’ negative preferences, as a right of veto,
may be the most promising path to preserving the traditional advantages of the
separation between ownership and management. Oversight through negative veto
allows the board to operate on a regular basis without the interference of the
shareholders, who lack the information and operational expertise of the company’s
board and management. Requirements of shareholder approval instantiates only a
periodic opportunity for the protection of the shareholders’ negative preferences.
Oversight through negative veto, in other words, empowers the board to act on its
discretion, just what advocates of “director primacy” so value about the American
corporate model, subject only to the possibility of veto in the background.142 By
contrast, affirmative rights of initiation for shareholders appear to pose clearer ex
ante interference with the management discretion in the best interests of the
corporation.143

138. McDonnell, supra note 98, at 143.
139. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 53.
140. Bebchuk et al., supra note 44; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The
Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen
& Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 783 (2009).
141. Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 854.
142. See Bainbridge, supra note 86; Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 88.
143. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 396, 396–408 (acknowledging the
argument that shareholders are “unlikely to know better than the managers how to run the
firms” but concluding that shareholder voting induces healthy incentives for managers and
produces more efficient companies).
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Indeed, reinforcing shareholders’ veto rights may be the best way to balance
board accountability and discretion in a way that closely fits shareholders’ interests
as a class. Because of the calculus of rational ignorance, shareholders do not
necessarily want the burdens of becoming more informed and developing
affirmative preferences about the best designs for the corporation. A simple but
effective right of veto would be enough for many shareholders as a check on
management.144
Robert Thompson and Paul Edelman argue along similar lines that shareholder
voting occurs, and should occur, only when it advances the goal of “error
correction” vis-à-vis corporate management.145 Thompson and Edelman clarify that
shareholder voting improves the corporate decision-making process when it permits
shareholders to correct errors by corporate management,146 but not necessarily
when it goes beyond this capacity.147 Notably, though, Thompson and Edelman do
not understand their approach in terms of shareholder preferences. In fact, they

144. A shareholder veto right protects shareholders not only from management, but also
from each other. A requirement of majority shareholder approval allows the shareholders to
block value-reducing proposals introduced by other shareholders. Shareholders are a
heterogeneous group in important ways and do not always share the same interests with
respect to the corporation. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote
and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (2008).
Institutional shareholders such as hedge funds possess high levels of information and
expertise about company affairs, but they also are more likely to have economic interests
that diverge from the typical shareholder with respect to the direction of the company. Crossshareholder divergences of interest raise concerns about rent-seeking in the venture capital
context, see Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy
of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 113 (2006), and opponents of shareholder activism
see these concerns as prominent in the public company context. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra
note 7, at 564–92; Stout, supra note 95. In the context of shareholder voting across a
heterogeneous electorate, the protective benefits for shareholder interests through veto rights
may be particularly useful in negotiating conflicts of interest among differently positioned
shareholders.
Assuming effective veto rights, anything that does not benefit at least a majority of
shares should not be approved by the shareholders. Shareholder voting as veto has a political
analog in this narrow respect in consociationalism. Consociationalism is a system of national
governance that permits rival socio-ethnic groups a mutual veto, among other things, over
sensitive issues of government policy. See AREND LIJPHART, POWER-SHARING IN SOUTH
AFRICA 6 (Inst. of Int’l Studies, Policy Papers in International Affairs Ser. No. 24, 1985)
(defining consociationalism as (i) executive power sharing, (ii) internal autonomy for
groups, (iii) proportional representation and allocation of civil service positions, and (iv) a
minority veto on vital issues). This form of consociational democracy protects groups in a
divided polity by providing a unilateral veto to block legislation inimical to their vital
interests. Just so, shareholder veto rights allow shareholders to protect themselves by
blocking management or shareholder proposals that would reduce company value. Of
course, there is a critical difference between shareholder vetoes and consociational
democracy—only a majority of the outstanding shares can effectuate a veto, while
consociationalism by design vests the minority with a veto right over the majority. Id.
However, shareholder voting uses veto rights to serve mainly as a familiar form of selfprotection for shareholder groups within a heterogeneous electorate.
145. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 11, at 146–52.
146. Id. at 151.
147. Id. at 173.

1326

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1299

argue that shareholder voting should be understood as “no longer merely an
aggregation of preferences, but rather an aggregation of information” about what
will maximize share price.148 Assuming that shareholder preferences are generally
driven by a focus on share price, as I do, there is no real difference between their
focus on “error correction” and my focus on negative preferences.
Thompson and Edelman’s real point, I think, is that shareholders are well
positioned to develop and vote on negative preferences about corporate
management in ways that they are not similarly positioned with respect to
affirmative preferences. I agree. However, Thompson and Edelman strain to
articulate their approach as one focused on error correction and information, in
contradistinction to shareholder preferences, in the absence of a conceptual
vocabulary of affirmative and negative preferences.
Shareholder voting can achieve an important measure of shareholder
accountability, despite the challenges of rational ignorance, once the normative
focus is shifted to a model of shareholder voting as veto. Shareholder-voting
reforms that focus on negative preferences, rather than their affirmative
preferences, are less likely to run into the costs of reform commonly identified by
opponents of shareholder activism while going a long way toward satisfying real
concerns of shareholders and proponents of shareholder activism. Understanding
negative preferences and their role in this context provides a better guide to what
should be the effective goals of shareholder voting and the best directions for any
efforts at reform to achieve those goals.
B. The Shareholder Veto in Practice
How well do shareholders exercise their veto, at least where they have it, under
current law? Shareholders face voting decisions about two major categories of
choices: First, shareholders vote on board nominees, major transactions, and
management proposals, all of which are sponsored by management; second,
shareholders vote on certain proposals by qualified shareholders, principally about
matters of corporate governance, which management generally opposes. In both
cases, shareholders overwhelmingly tend to defer to the board except under limited
circumstances when deference rationally is less deserved.
This general deference to the board, coupled with the institutional advantage of
management, means that board-nominated candidates for director and proposals
from management tend overwhelmingly to win approval from shareholders, just as
management recommends.149 That is, in the context of large, publicly held
companies, shareholders very rarely oppose management’s direction on proposals
presented for a vote. Yair Listokin reports that management proposals receive on
average 85% favorable votes and only 14% negative votes out of total votes cast.150
By contrast, shareholder-sponsored proposals that do not usually enjoy
management support receive on average just less than 32% favorable votes.151

148. Id. at 133.
149. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8.
150. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
159, 170 (2008).
151. Id.
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What is more, even when the vote is close, Listokin finds that management
proposals are overwhelmingly more likely to win votes by a small margin than to
lose by a small margin.152 Indeed, other studies find that proposals from
shareholders receive majority support less than 5% of the time.153 Management, in
short, exercises sufficient control over the shareholder voting process that it usually
can monitor, influence, and mobilize enough shareholder votes as needed, when
needed, to win approval of proposals that it favors.
However, shareholders shake out of their regular deference when company
performance is poor. Shareholders, for instance, are least likely to defer to
management and most likely to vote in favor of shareholder proposals when the
company has underperformed.154 Although shareholders tend to defer as a general
matter to management, shareholders’ trust in management erodes when the
company performs badly and management’s competence appropriately comes into
question. When deciding whether to defer to or veto management’s
recommendations, shareholders focus on a discrete question informed by a standing
opinion about management’s competence, which is in turn based heavily on
retrospective information about share price. Share price offers a salient, accessible
measure of performance that shareholders, even unsophisticated shareholders with
relatively little information, can readily monitor over time as a proxy for
competence.
Shareholders are more likely, as a result, to engage in a proxy contest to
challenge the incumbent board, and are also more likely to vote for challengers in a
proxy contest, when company performance has been weak. The empirical literature
is clear that companies are much more likely to face a proxy contest when their
recent performance lags behind the industry standard. One study estimates that
companies that face a proxy contest to the incumbent board have experienced
34.4% lower stock returns and 39.3% lower income growth on average than
comparable firms over the previous five years.155
There is much less research about the degree to which shareholder support for a
proxy challenger depends on the past performance of the incumbent board. Part of
the reason for the paucity of research is that proxy contests are reasonably rare,

152. See id. at 172–80.
153. See Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Information, Ownership Structure, and
Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance
Proposals, 48 J. FIN. 697 (1993) (finding 4.51% of proposals were approved in 1990);
Jonathan M. Karpoff, Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Corporate Governance and
Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (1996) (finding 4.2% of
proposals were approved from 1986 to 1990).
154. See David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the
Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405, 432 (1993).
155. Id. at 406–07. See generally Joel Hasbrouck, The Characteristics of Takeover
Targets: q and Other Measures, 9 J. BANKING & FIN. 351 (1985); Larry H.P. Lang, René M.
Stulz & Ralph A. Walkling, Managerial Performance, Tobin’s q, and the Gains from
Successful Tender Offers, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 137 (1989); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 842
(1989); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change:
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279 (1998).
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given the legal impediments to bringing a proxy challenge.156 However, as a rough
descriptive statistic, one recent study finds that companies in which a proxy
challenger wins the contested board’s seats experienced roughly 10% worse than
average performance, as measured by five-year share price return indexed against
the S&P 500, compared to roughly 5% better than average performance by
companies where the proxy challenge was unsuccessful.157
We know a great deal more about shareholder voting for shareholder proposals,
and the available empirical literature finds conclusively that shareholder support for
shareholder
proposals
is
predictably
associated
with
corporate
underperformance.158 Compared to proxy contests, the costs of making shareholder
proposals are substantially lower, and shareholders’ proposals are much more
commonly presented for shareholder votes than for proxy contests. Lilli Gordon
and John Pound study the relationship between shareholder support for shareholder
proposals and the company’s long-term market return, and they find that poor stock
market performance by the company is significantly related to voting support for
shareholder proposals.159 As they summarize, “the worse is the long-term
performance of the firm, the higher is the vote for shareholder proposals.”160
Another study reaches essentially the same conclusion over a longer period of
company performance and concludes that “[t]he poorer the performance over the
previous five years, the higher the number of votes in favor of the shareholder
proposal.”161 In other words, shareholders are most likely to buck management by
voting for shareholder proposals against management’s usual recommendation
when company underperformance seems to have undercut shareholders’ usual
posture of deference.
Shareholders also sensibly submit more shareholder proposals to
underperforming companies.162 When the company performs poorly, not only are
shareholders more likely to vote for shareholder proposals, management tends to be
challenged by a greater number of proposals as well, usually from shareholders
who hope to change the company’s direction. One study finds that the likelihood

156. See supra Part I.A.
157. See Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1797–
99 (2011). Harris also argues that five-year share performance is uncorrelated to the success
of the challenger, but his performance measure may be too highly correlated with his
variable of interest, challenger campaign expenses, to draw definitive conclusions across the
forty or so cases studied. Id. at 1799–1800; see also Richard M. Duvall & Douglas V.
Austin, Predicting the Results of Proxy Contests, 20 J. FIN. 464, 467 (1965) (“[T]he results
of control contests probably depend on the rate of return of the firm relative to its industry.”).
158. See, e.g., Gordon & Pound, supra note 153, at 712.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and
Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 295 (2000).
162. George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 135 (2010); see also Roberta Romano, Less Is More:
Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18
YALE J. ON REG. 174, 183–84 & nn.21–25 (2001) (summarizing the research that finds
targets of shareholder activism tend to be poor performers on a variety of measures); Deon
Strickland, Kenneth W. Wiles & Marc Zenner, A Requiem for the USA: Is Small
Shareholder Monitoring Effective?, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 319 (1996).
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that a company receives a shareholder proposal is inversely proportional to
important measures of company performance during the three preceding years,
such as market-to-book ratio, operating return on sales, and recent sales growth.163
Another study finds that companies targeted by shareholder proposals performed
significantly worse—indeed 22% worse—than the average market performance
during the previous year.164
However, shareholders do not reflexively support greater shareholder control,
but instead shareholders’ preferences over process appear to depend on whether the
company is managed well. At least when limited to simple binary questions that
lend themselves to a veto choice, shareholders appear to behave rationally in favor
of measures that generally benefit shareholders and enhance the value of their
companies.165 Studies likewise show that shareholders appear to be sensitive to the
sponsorship of a shareholder proposal in deciding whether to support it.166
Specifically, studies find that proposals sponsored by institutional investors and
prominent financial figures enjoy significantly greater support.167 Like voters in
political elections, shareholders respond to the informational signal from counterendorsements against management’s position by trusted sources. This counterendorsement serves as a voting cue not to trust management’s position on the
proposal and helps overcome shareholders’ usual deference.
The one area where shareholders are most likely to buck management’s
recommendation, even when company performance is satisfactory, actually
strengthens the case for shareholder voting. Shareholders are most likely to vote in
favor of a shareholder proposal over management objection when the proposal is
familiar and empirically shown to enhance shareholder value. For instance,
shareholders vote most consistently in support of well-known corporate governance
proposals that dismantle a company’s anti-takeover devices.168 Anti-takeover
devices insulate directors and officers from replacement by bidders who identify
underperformance by the company and seek to capture gains from better
management by taking over the company. This threat of a takeover better
incentivizes managers and is associated empirically with shareholder value, while
the presence of anti-takeover devices that deter takeovers is empirically associated
with managerial underperformance.169 Shareholders, therefore, rationally should
oppose anti-takeover devices and support measures to remove them in companies
whose shares they own. That is what they do.
Shareholders, for another example, oppose staggered boards and vote for
proposals to eliminate them.170 Staggered boards, as empirical research has

163. See Karpoff et al., supra note 153, at 366, 380, 392.
164. See Thomas & Cotter, supra note 112, at 374–75.
165. See McDonnell, supra note 98, at 178.
166. Gillan & Starks, supra note 161, at 285–88.
167. See id.; Karpoff et al., supra note 153; Thomas & Cotter, supra note 112, at 371.
168. Thomas & Cotter, supra note 112, at 389.
169. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage
Setting?: A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535 (1999); Garvey &
Hanka, supra note 55; Gompers et al., supra note 55; Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom
Nohel, Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN.
274 (2008).
170. See Guo et al., supra note 169, at 275.
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demonstrated, depress the return to shareholders of takeover targets and are
correlated with lower firm value.171 Staggered boards, by spreading out the term of
individual directors and by staggering their election years, require any hostile
bidder for a company to replace the incumbent board over a longer period of time.
This elongation of the process raises costs and deters bidders and, therefore,
reduces the threat of a takeover that would discipline managers and enhance
shareholder value. In the most comprehensive study of staggered boards, Lucian
Bebchuk, John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian document the negative effect of
staggered boards on shareholder value and conclude that “staggered boards are the
most powerful anti-takeover device in the current arsenal of takeover defense
weapons.”172 For this reason, shareholder activists and corporate governance
reformers advocate for the de-staggering of a company’s board as a way of
removing obstacles to takeover bids and reinforcing shareholder value.
Shareholders rationally tend to vote in favor of such proposals, and in fact, the
approval rates for such proposals are often the highest for any category of
shareholder proposal.173 Furthermore, shareholders also buck management
opposition to these proposals because they know that the usual deference to
management would be counter to their interests. Not only do shareholders support
the de-staggering of boards, shareholders tend to provide strong support for the
removal of other anti-takeover devices as well, such as poison pills.174
However, shareholders do not vote indiscriminately for proposals styled as
corporate governance reform and instead tend to vote against proposals with little
or no empirical support as value enhancing for shareholders. Shareholders
discriminate among corporate governance reforms and appear to support them
selectively based at least in part on whether there is powerful consensus about their
value.175 Shareholders support de-staggering boards on one hand, but on the other
hand, shareholders are decidedly and rationally ambivalent, for instance, about say
on pay advisory voting on executive compensation. Jie Cai and Ralph Walkling
find that adoption of say on pay appears disfavored by the equity markets and
companies.176 Consistent with this finding, proposals for say on pay generally do
not receive majority support of shareholders.177 Cai and Walkling also find,

171. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1549, 1561–62 (2010); Bebchuk et al., supra note 44; Guo et al., supra note 169, at
276.
172. Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 950; see also Guo et al., supra note 169, at 276.
173. See, e.g., GEORGESON, 2009 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 20–21
(2009); see also Guo et al., supra note 169, at 275.
174. Although the empirical literature is not always as clear regarding the benefit of
various anti-takeover devices, dependent at least in part on individual firm characteristics, it
is reasonable for shareholders to support measures that, in theory, would increase share
value. See James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles & Rory L. Terry, Outside Directors and the
Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1994) (finding positive price effects for some
firms and negative ones for other types); Gordon & Pound, supra note 153, at 712; Romano,
supra note 162, at 224 (“It is . . . altogether reasonable for investors to believe that the
removal of a pill will be beneficial for some firms, and to support such proposals . . . .”);
Strickland et al., supra note 162.
175. See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 22, at 521.
176. See Cai & Walkling, supra note 24.
177. Id. at 330.
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however, that shareholders depart from the usual disapproval for say on pay and
tend to vote for say on pay’s institution when the CEO of the company is
overpaid.178 Shareholder support for say on pay therefore appears to be tepid in
most cases when say on pay would do little good, but shareholder support for its
institution rationally increases when say on pay is responsive to excessive
executive compensation.179 Other proposals that receive weak shareholder support
“can be viewed as more qualitative and difficult for shareholders to analyze,” such
as measures to change the compensation of executives, the selection of auditors,
and the composition of the board.180
A criticism of expanded proxy access for shareholders is that it would place too
much leverage in the hands of a few major shareholders who can exploit their
consolidated control and the diffusion of the remaining market capitalization.181
This worry may be particularly acute today with the rise of activist hedge funds
eager to take large positions in a company and to use that leverage to dominate
corporate policy.182 Activist hedge funds might be motivated to sponsor proposals,
under expanded proxy access provided by current reforms, that benefit their narrow
interests rather than shareholders as a class. Bainbridge argues that proxy reform
that would expand shareholder voting rights “seems likely to disrupt the very
mechanism that makes the widely held public corporation practicable: namely, the
centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board
of directors.”183 Intrusive activism by hedge funds is a relatively new phenomenon
and may well become problematic, perhaps even requiring new legal inventions,
such as fiduciary duties for activist shareholders, as some argue.184
There is thus far, however, only limited evidence of the costs of hedge fund
activism. More important, shareholders generally do not appear unduly attracted to
value-reducing measures when asked to vote on them and appear to vote rationally
in favor of many significant measures that appear to advantage shareholders as a
class. In other words, simply because shareholders are presented with valuereducing proposals does not mean that shareholders will vote for and approve them.
Shareholders defend their negative preferences against harmful or wasteful
proposals reasonably well. This is particularly so when management regards certain
proposals as harmful or wasteful and communicates that opinion to shareholders. If
anything, the principal concern today appears to be that shareholder voting tends to
defer to management too much.

178. Id.
179. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119 (2010)
(reporting that shareholders in the United Kingdom used say on pay votes to discipline the
management of poorly performing firms but not management of high performing firms).
180. Gordon & Pound, supra note 153, at 712.
181. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 7; Strine, supra note 46, at 1765.
182. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 76 (discussing activist hedge funds and proposing
the imposition of fiduciary duties on them).
183. Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 1749.
184. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 76.
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IV. THE REFORM IMPLICATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING AS VETO
The practice of shareholder voting as veto offers a few suggestions about how
sensibly shareholders can exercise their veto and thus provides a model upon which
to build reform. Shareholder-voting reform that builds upon the strengths of
shareholders is likely to be more successful than blanket critics of shareholder
voting currently allege.
However, the prognosis is less clear for shareholder-voting reform that goes
beyond the revealed strengths of shareholders as defenders of the negative
preferences through veto voting. Shareholder-voting reform that asks shareholders
to make more difficult judgments beyond their veto oversight of management
presents challenges that shareholders have less experience in handling. In short, the
practice of shareholder voting as veto, once understood as such, demonstrates what
works about shareholder voting and where it can build in terms of reform, and it
also makes clear where shareholder-voting reform might go wrong.
A. Building on the Shareholder Veto
Any reform of shareholder voting can effectively build on the strengths of
shareholders as veto decisionmakers in response to management. Shareholders
effectively monitor management and sensibly exercise their veto in light of that
monitoring. The usual critiques of shareholder voting fall away to a significant
degree if shareholders are competent at exercising their veto and if voting decisions
are structured to suit that competence.
Most prominent among new voting matters for shareholders in recent years is
say on pay. As described earlier, say on pay requires a company to hold a
nonbinding shareholder vote on the company’s executive compensation. Say on
pay as a concept dates back at least to the early 1990s185 but was only recently
adopted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.186 Dodd-Frank requires both an inaugural vote on companies’ executive
compensation, as well as a separate shareholder vote on how frequently say on pay
votes should be held going forward.187
Early criticism of say on pay in its first year of practice focused on the fact that
shareholders actually tended not to reject executive pay even after receiving the
opportunity to vote against it. John Helyar reported that Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) advised its clients to vote no on executive pay for 293 companies,
accounting for roughly 12% of its recommendations, midway through 2011.188
However, only thirty-two companies received a negative shareholder vote on
executive pay, out of a total of 1998 companies that held annual meetings midway

185. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Essay, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K.
Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 341–42 (2009)
(describing the early history of say on pay legislation in the United Kingdom).
186. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
187. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1).
188. John Helyar, After Much Hoopla, Investor ‘Say on Pay’ Is a Bust, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, June 20, 2011, at 23, 23.
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through 2011—just 2% of those companies.189 Nearly three-quarters of companies
in the Russell 3000 passed their executive compensation with more than 90%
shareholder approval.190 As one proxy advisor observed, the big institutional
investors “won’t vote against management . . . unless they’re really bad.”191
This pattern of shareholder deference in the absence of poor management
performance is perfectly predictable. Shareholders are unlikely to prioritize
executive compensation, which generally accounts for a very small percentage of
any public company’s expenses.192 As a result, shareholders are unlikely to
intervene unless management performance is sufficiently bad that it forces
shareholders to pay greater attention as a general matter and contemplate the more
aggressive exercise of a veto even on executive compensation. An earlier empirical
study on say on pay indicated accordingly that proposals to institute say on pay
from 2006 to 2008, before the passage of Dodd-Frank, did not tend to receive
majority shareholder approval and averaged less than 30% of shareholder
support.193 In other words, shareholders did not reflexively vote for measures to
curb executive pay. Shareholder support for instituting say on pay increases almost
exclusively when the company’s CEO actually is overpaid.194 In short, shareholder
voting in support of instituting say on pay is fairly reasonable so far as it goes.
The widespread introduction of say on pay actually channels shareholder
dissatisfaction with executive compensation into more manageable, less intrusive
directions. Say on pay allows shareholders a direct channel of expression about
executive compensation that was previously unavailable. Before say on pay,
shareholders who wished to vent frustration with executive compensation were
forced to express their discontent only indirectly, by withholding support from
director candidates and compensation committee nominees. With the introduction
of say on pay, those crude expressions of shareholder dissatisfaction decreased.195
As ISS reported, “[t]he advent of ‘say on pay’ has contributed to a significant
decline in shareholder opposition to director elections at U.S. firms in 2011.”196
For precisely these reasons, sweeping criticism of say on pay is difficult to
understand. Stephen Bainbridge argues that say on pay, by involving even this
limited measure of shareholder preference into corporate decisionmaking, “seems
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable;

189. Id.
190. SEMLER BROSSY CONSULTING GRP., LLC, 2011 SAY ON PAY RESULTS: RUSSELL 3000
(2011), available at http://www.semlerbrossy.com/pages/htindex.php.
191. Helyar, supra note 188, at 24.
192. See Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & the
Obama Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 545–46 (2010) (“[I]t would be difficult to avoid the reasoning
that even seemingly astronomical sums are insignificant when compared to the cost of
having inadequate leadership.”).
193. Cai & Walkling, supra note 24, at 330.
194. Id.
195. TED ALLEN, JOLENE DUGAN, ERIK MELL, CAROLYN MATHIASEN, EDWARD
KAMONJOH, ROEL DELGADO & OGUZ TOLON, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., 2011
U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT 30 (2011) (reporting the number of directors receiving less than
50% nosedived from 93% in 2009 and 51% in 2010 to just 45% in 2011).
196. Id.
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namely, the vesting of ‘authoritative control’ in the board of directors.”197 This
intrusion by shareholders is disruptive because “[f]or the average shareholder, the
necessary investment of time and effort in making informed voting decisions
simply is not worthwhile.”198 But it is for this reason that the average shareholder is
quite unlikely in the usual case to depart from the dominant pattern of deferring to
management, just as Bainbridge would advise. In this case, shareholders would
defer to authoritative board control, just as shareholder voting in 2011 appears to
bear out, rather than disrupt it.199 If “executive perks seem to be set with
shareholder interests in mind,”200 as Bainbridge contends, then shareholders are
rightly endorsing management’s position on the issue. Shareholders would tend to
vote against management’s proposed executive compensation mainly when
company performance has been rocky enough to jar shareholders’ attention and
trigger potentially negative preference and scrutiny about management suggestions.
Shareholder voting, on say on pay and otherwise, is heavily influenced by the
recommendation of important proxy advisors. Proxy advisors—most prominently
ISS but also PROXY Governance, Inc., Glass, Lewis & Company, and others—
make recommendations to their institutional clients about how they should cast
their proxy in shareholder voting matters.201 ISS, for instance, offers its clients
voting recommendations on all shareholder voting questions as well as a research
report supporting those recommendations.202 ISS’s recommendations in particular
carry great weight among its clients and are credited with being able to sway as
much as 30% of the vote in any proxy contest.203 One study of mutual fund voting
observes that “mutual funds tend to vote in line with ISS recommendations across
the board.”204
The fact that shareholders might rely on a heuristic voting cue from the
endorsements of proxy advisors is utterly unsurprising. Voters in similar large-scale
electorates regularly rely on heuristic cue-taking from credible agents who are
perceived to have the same values and can be reasonably trusted to offer the
recommendation that the voter would have reached with the investment of time and
thought.205 These agents in the context of political voting are called political
parties, trusted political endorsers, and various media figures among others. When

197. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, REG., Spring 2009, at 42, 46.
198. Id. at 47.
199. See, e.g., Jeremy Ryan Delman, Note, Structuring Say-on-Pay: A Comparative Look
at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 2010 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 538, 609–13 (finding that European shareholders reliably defer to management on
say on pay-style votes).
200. Bainbridge, supra note 197, at 44.
201. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role
of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 649 (2009).
202. Id. at 652.
203. Id. at 657.
204. Cotter et al., supra note 112, at 2.
205. See generally SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER (1994); Michael S. Kang,
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues
and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus
Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections,
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994).
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a popular politican, respected pundit, or trusted interest group whose position the
voter values offers a voting recommendation, the voter can rely on that
recommendation as an economizing device. Just so, shareholders rely on ISS’s
recommendation to the degree that they trust ISS’s judgments to be consistent with
their own. Of course, shareholders cannot be confident that ISS’s recommendation
is always perfectly consistent with what would be their independent judgment. To
the degree that ISS’s recommendations prove unreliable over a longer period,
shareholders will lose confidence in ISS and depart from their recommendation in
favor of greater independence, or more likely a different proxy advisor. To expect
shareholders to depend less on heuristic cues than voters in virtually every other
mass voting context is simply unrealistic and unproductive.
As a result, it is difficult to sympathize with the abstract concerns about say on
pay, particularly structured as a nonbinding veto of management decision making.
What is more, the success of shareholder voting as veto should bode well for the
sensibility of shareholder voting on other potential avenues of reform that take a
similar path. Most prominently, corporate governance reformers have pushed for
shareholder rights of approval for corporate campaign expenditures in the wake of
Citizens United v. FEC.206 That Supreme Court decision held that longstanding
government prohibitions on corporate expenditures on political campaigning were
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.207 The decision therefore raised the
possibility that the usual principal-agent concerns about management discretion
would extend to corporate campaign spending against the preferences of company
shareholders.208
The Shareholder Protection Act would require shareholder approval of a
company’s campaign contributions and expenditures in a binding vote that
basically follows the model of say on pay.209 Management would need to obtain
majority shareholder approval in advance of corporate campaign contributions or
expenditures. This requirement again enables shareholders to reject management’s
recommendations through a shareholder veto, but it would not by itself empower
shareholders to propose any corporate contributions or expenditures as an
alternative to management’s preference.
The Shareholder Protection Act’s requirement of shareholder approval for
corporate electioneering is consistent with the model of shareholder voting as veto.
Shareholders are likely to defer overwhelmingly to management, particularly when
the company is performing well, regardless of their individual political preferences
distinct from the company’s political agenda. Rationally ignorant shareholders
would go along with management recommendations except when poor company
performance alerts them to closer monitoring of management and activates
potential negative preferences against management’s recommendations.

206. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
207. See generally Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010)
(describing Citizens United and its consequences for campaign finance law).
208. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political
Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (advocating for disclosure of corporate
campaign expenditures and other politically related spending as well as required shareholder
approval of corporate political spending).
209. Shareholder Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011).
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Indeed, this pattern is exactly what Ciara Torres-Spelliscy and Kathy Fogel find
in their study of the United Kingdom’s parallel experience with the U.K.
Companies Act.210 Like the Shareholder Protection Act, the enacted U.K.
Companies Act requires British companies to seek shareholder approval of their
political budgets.211 Although several companies avoided the Act’s requirements by
proposing no political spending at all, British companies tended overwhelmingly to
seek and obtain shareholder approval for more political spending than they actually
ended up making. On average, companies received 94%–97% approval for their
proposed budgets from shareholders voting their shares, with an annual average of
a third to half of shares abstaining or otherwise failing to vote.212 Shareholders
deferred to management in almost all cases such that any disruption is likely to be
minimal in all but the exceptional case. And the empirical evidence from
shareholder voting suggests that the exceptional case is likely to be one where
shareholders sensibly intervene more aggressively against management.213
Admittedly, campaign spending in the United Kingdom is much less than in the
United States,214 but it is precisely with respect to political concerns where
shareholders are likely to be most deferential to management. Shareholders are very
hostile to political appeals that do not relate directly to returns on shareholder
value.215 Shareholders vote in waves against shareholder proposals based on socalled social responsibility and political concerns.216 Shareholders tend to be
narrowly focused on maximizing their returns and accordingly defer to
management on most politically salient matters that are unlikely to involve serious
issues of corporate profitability. It is with respect to corporate governance matters,
where shareholders’ financial interests can conflict most acutely with
management’s, that shareholders pay special attention and are most likely to vote
against management’s recommendations.
B. Reinforcing the Shareholder Veto
Where the shareholder veto is practically ineffective under current law,
shareholder-voting reform directed toward the effective exercise of a shareholder
veto plays to the strengths of shareholders as veto overseers of management.
Shareholder-voting reform can unlock the ability of shareholders to defend their
interests effectively through their veto, just as they do effectively in other areas of
corporate governance.

210. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, Shareholder-Authorized Corporate
Political Spending in the United Kingdom, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 525, 545–47 (2011).
211. See id. at 545.
212. See id. at 568.
213. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
214. Torres-Spelliscy & Fogel, supra note 210, at 537–38.
215. See, e.g., Cotter et al., supra note 112, at 15 (finding political proposals receive only
5% of shareholder votes, compared with 59% for anti-takeover proposals).
216. See, e.g., Thomas & Cotter, supra note 112, at 389 (finding that shareholders vote
strongly against social responsibility proposals that bear little relationship with shareholder
value).
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One opportunity for reinforcing shareholder veto rights is board elections. As a
formal matter, shareholders have the right to withhold their votes from
management nominees for the board of directors. They can thus formally express a
negative preference against management in the formal sense. However, this formal
ability to withhold their votes and express disapproval has little practical
consequence. The reason for this fact is that under current law, it is very costly, and
therefore extremely rare, for shareholders or other interests to run competing
candidates against management’s nominees in a proxy fight. As a result, almost all
management nominees run unopposed even when there is dissatisfaction with those
nominees among shareholders.217
In this situation, when only management’s nominees are presented for a proxy
vote, management’s nominee wins with even a single vote as the highest eligible
vote getter. Shareholders can vote against the nominees presented by management,
but the effect of that nay vote is formally negligible. Without any effective veto
power, dissatisfied shareholders have increasingly voted against or withheld their
votes for board nominees as a show of dissatisfaction, even though virtually all of
those nominees would be elected regardless of their votes or nonvotes.218 While
these campaigns to withhold votes may spur management to negotiate with
dissatisfied shareholders, there is no formal mechanism by which shareholders can
exercise a veto in the same way that they can on other management proposals.
The SEC’s proposed amendments to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11 were aimed at
reinforcing the shareholder veto when it comes to board elections. The amendments
would have given shareholders much greater leverage to veto management
nominees for the board by making it much easier for qualified shareholders to offer
alternative candidates for the board of directors against management’s nominees.219
Shareholders who have owned, individually or as part of a shareholder group, at
least 3% of outstanding shares for the previous three years, would have been able to
nominate a nominee for the board of directors to be included in the company’s
proxy materials, subject to certain limitations.220 This qualification of ownership
stake would help ensure that only significant shareholders with financial interests in
the company exercise this option. Those nominating shareholders would need to
make certain disclosures in advance, as well as promise to hold their shares through
the annual meeting.221 The critical element of the SEC’s proposed amendments was
the nominating shareholders’ right to include their nominee in the company’s proxy
materials, distributed to all shareholders at the company’s cost.222 This right of
inclusion in the company’s proxy materials avoided the need for the nominating
shareholders to distribute their own proxy materials, subject to federal securities
law, at high, usually prohibitive financial cost.

217. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 679–87 (2007) (finding electoral challenges extremely
rare, with only thirty contested solicitations per year, on average).
218. See GEORGESON, supra note 173, at 5.
219. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed
June 10, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 & 274).
220. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,668, 56,672–75
(2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
221. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,037.
222. Id. at 29,049.
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Although it is easy to see these proposals as aimed at empowering shareholders
to name their ideal set of candidates, they are better understood in light of the fact
that current law provides little opportunity for shareholder veto in board elections.
As such, the SEC’s proposals served a more modest, and more important, purpose.
The proposed changes to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11 would have made it more likely,
when shareholders are unhappy with the board, to have a real chance to veto the
board’s nominee by voting for an alternate candidate. If shareholders are able to
include competing nominees against the management candidates in the company’s
proxy materials, shareholders as voters will have a true alternative, and therefore
the chance to veto when the circumstances are right. Management candidates would
need to receive more votes than a competing nominee, and the number of
shareholder votes against them would matter. The nomination proposals therefore
made more meaningful the shareholders’ right of veto that they have in theory, but
not in practice, under current law.
To honor the negative preferences of shareholders, corporate democracy should
permit shareholders to effectively veto some meaningful level of management
discretion with which they do not agree.223 That is, even under Stephen
Bainbridge’s most skeptical account, shareholder voting must serve at least as “an
accountability device of last resort” that can be exercised effectively in practice, if
shareholder voting is to be useful at all.224 Where management nominees run
unopposed under plurality voting rules, shareholders have virtually no ability to
impose any accountability or exercise the necessary veto power.225 If shareholder
interests in corporate governance are primarily negative preferences at their heart,
then shareholders may desire stronger mechanisms for veto oversight on matters
they already vote on but have little practical veto power over.226
The D.C. Circuit, however, enjoined SEC implementation and enforcement of
its amendments to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11 in Business Roundtable v. SEC.227 The
decision found that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act, in failing to consider adequately the economic

223. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 1750 (acknowledging that shareholder voting
is useful, perhaps necessary, as a means of enforcing the norm of shareholder wealth
maximization); Strine, supra note 46, at 1762 (“These constraints—that stockholders
approve certain important transactions such as mergers [and] vote for directors annually . . .
are vital.”).
224. Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 1750.
225. Under a simple plurality voting rule, shareholders elect directors with only a
plurality of the eligible votes either present or represented by proxy at the shareholder
meeting and entitled to vote. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy
for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 904–05 (1993)
(explaining how plurality voting rules thwart shareholder efforts to vote down management
nominees).
226. Robert Thompson and Paul Edelman propose that shareholder approval should be
required for transactions that are the financial equivalent of mergers, such as triangular
mergers and acquisition of assets. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 11, at 170, 173–
174. Expansion of the shareholders’ right of veto is consistent with what they call the “error
correction” role of shareholders, without increasing the shareholders’ affirmative powers of
initiation. See id.
227. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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consequences of the amendments pursuant to federal law.228 The amendments, by
expanding shareholders’ access to the company’s proxy materials, would have
increased the number of contested board seats and generate company expense to the
degree that management chose to oppose shareholder nominees through active
solicitation and campaigning for its nominees. These costs would be minimized,
according to the SEC, by the fact that shareholder access to the company’s proxy
would be limited under the amendments to shareholders with sufficient stake in the
company such that frequent or wasteful nominations would be unlikely.229 Any
costs from frequent or wasteful nominations, the theory for the amendments went,
should be offset by shareholder gains in spurring board performance through better
incentives and membership. That, of course, is the theory for encouraging
shareholder nominations adopted by the SEC. However, in light of what the court
viewed as “admittedly (and at best) ‘mixed’ empirical evidence,” the court ruled
that the SEC had not sufficiently supported its judgment that shareholder
nomination through expanded proxy access would “result in improved board and
company performance and shareholder value.”230
The D.C. Circuit penalized the SEC for the relative lack of existing empirical
research on shareholder nominations through greater proxy access.231 The court
acted on its concerns about encouraging shareholder nominations, siding with the
Business Roundtable, in the absence of powerful evidence in either direction.232
There is evidence that the SEC proposals were valued by the financial markets for
their potential to improve company performance and shareholder value.233 The SEC
announced in October 2010 that it would be forced to delay implementation of its
proposals as a result of the Business Roundtable litigation.234 The announcement
provided a natural experiment that revealed the degree to which the markets valued
the SEC proposals’ effect on affected companies.235 Bo Becker, Daniel
Bergstresser, and Guhan Subramanian found that firms with substantial
institutional ownership, the companies likely to be most affected by the SEC
proposals, lost market value following the announcement.236
As the market response suggests, the SEC’s proposals need not burden
companies and board management as much as the D.C. Circuit feared in Business
Roundtable. Of course, the board would still present its nominees, and an
overwhelming amount of the time, those nominees will win board seats whether the

228. Id. at 1156.
229. Id. at 1150.
230. Id. at 1151.
231. Id. at 1150.
232. Id. at 1151.
233. See Becker et al., supra note 15.
234. Id. at 2–3.
235. Id. at 3.
236. See id. at 3–4; see also Jonathan B. Cohn, Stuart L. Gillan & Jay C. Hartzell, On
Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd-) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access (Dec. 7,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers/cfm?abstract_id=1742506 (reaching
similar conclusions in looking market reaction to several SEC announcements relating to its
proxy access proposals). But see Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy
Access Damage Share Value in Small Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (2012) (finding
negative returns for small firms covered by the SEC’s proxy access rule).
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election is contested or not. Any competing candidates nominated separately by
shareholders would need to win a plurality of votes from voters who tend in the
normal course to be rationally ignorant about company specifics and reluctant to
deviate from the board’s recommendations. The important effect of the SEC
proposals would have been that unhappy shareholders would have had a
meaningful outlet for their dissatisfaction when they were not pleased with
company performance. They would have had the option of voting for someone else,
namely the shareholder’s nominee, and thus had the opportunity for a real veto that
they almost never possess in board elections.
Majority voting rules for board elections serve a similar purpose in reinforcing
shareholders’ negative preferences. They require director candidates to receive at
least a majority of eligible shareholder votes for election to the board.237 Under the
traditional plurality rule, even if every shareholder vote but one is withheld—that
is, not cast for the lone candidate as the only available signal of disapproval—the
board’s candidate still will be elected. The requirement that uncontested candidates
receive at least a majority of shareholder votes cast helps unhappy shareholders to
veto the election of disfavored candidates.238 For this reason, Senator Charles
Schumer included a mandatory majority voting rule in his “Shareholder Bill of
Rights,” introduced in May 2009 just ahead of the SEC proposals.239
Majority voting rules, in fact, have their roots in earlier shareholder movements
to withhold votes from underperforming boards purely as an expression of negative
preference.240 Withholding votes from a nominee running in an uncontested
election had little formal consequence under plurality voting rules, but institutional
investors nonetheless hoped that withholding votes from board candidates would
publicly signal some critical mass of shareholder discontent. Withholding votes
offered a way to communicate a negative preference, where no other avenue for
shareholder negative expression and veto was available, that might prod the
incumbent board into greater responsiveness to shareholder concerns. If nothing
else,241 majority voting rules offer an outlet to highlight such lack of support for
candidates by denying majority approval.

237. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 702; Velasco, supra note 53, at 641–42. A number of
major companies have adopted instead by bylaw or charter a modified plurality rule that
requires directors to proffer their resignation if they receive less than a majority of votes.
238. See generally Razzouk, supra note 71 (discussing the “majority vote movement” in
corporate law).
239. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5(4)(A) (2009).
240. See J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy With Moxie?: Majority Voting,
Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW.
1007, 1012–18 (2007) (describing the early withhold vote campaigns by institutional
investors); Grundfest, supra note 225 (proposing that dissatisfied shareholders should “just
vote no” as an expression of disapproval for directors of underperforming companies).
241. A significant practical problem with proposals for a majority voting requirement is
that, under the default holdover rule, incumbent nominees who fail to receive majority
approval would nonetheless be likely to continue in office until a new nominee, one who is
able to garner majority approval, is elected as replacement. For this reason, some
commentators conclude that majority voting provisions are “smoke and mirrors” in practice.
William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors,
40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 486–89 (2007).
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Again, majority voting rules need not extend the scope of shareholder
involvement in company affairs when applied only to situations where shareholder
approval is already required. Majority voting rules do not provide shareholders new
opportunities to propose new courses of action or interfere with the daily operations
of the company. They mainly offer shareholders greater opportunity to veto the
board’s nominees in those limited circumstances when the shareholders are
sufficiently dissatisfied to act against the board. What is more, the swift adoption of
majority voting rules by so many companies in recent years suggests that
shareholder demand for this type of limited reinforcement of shareholder veto
rights has increased.
Of course, there remains considerable room for debate about the optimal level of
shareholder oversight and opportunity for veto. None of this dictates the precise
amount of shareholder leverage over the board that would be optimal for
maximizing shareholder value. In Bebchuk’s view, almost any empowerment of
shareholder activism is a move in the right direction because the balance of power
is swung so harmfully in the direction of board autonomy under current law. In the
view of Bainbridge, Lynn Stout, and other opponents of shareholder activism,
almost any empowerment of shareholder prerogatives is a move in the wrong
direction. They view any increase in shareholder leverage over the board as a threat
to centralized management in the best interests of the company.242 These two sides,
proponents and opponents of shareholder activism, stand far apart in their views.
However, an emphasis on shareholders’ negative preferences and veto rights
comes closer to addressing the concerns of both sides. Shareholders as a class can
effectively exercise their negative preferences, without excessively interfering with
management, only if their option of negative veto has some teeth. Only
shareholders with even more vehement objections to board decision making must
sell their shares.
C. Shareholder Rights of Initiation Versus Shareholder Voting as Veto
A final lesson from an understanding of negative preferences is a distinction
between reform that effectuates shareholders’ affirmative preferences and
shareholders’ negative preferences. On one hand, as I describe above, shareholder
voting power could be increased by reinforcing their rights of oversight and veto
over the board. There may be need to reinforce shareholder power, and expand it,
but to do so mainly by bolstering the shareholders’ familiar veto rights, which
effectuate only negative, not affirmative, authority. On the other hand, shareholder
voting power could be increased by providing greater ability for shareholders to
effectuate their affirmative preferences over company policy through new rights of
initiation. Such reforms would not only increase shareholder control but would do
so by expanding shareholder prerogatives beyond the usual shareholder veto, and
instead look more squarely to shareholder affirmative preferences about the best
paths for the company, irrespective of management direction.
Most prominently, Lucian Bebchuk advocates “[i]ncreasing shareholder power
to intervene” affirmatively, giving shareholders the power “to initiate and vote on

242. See supra Part I.B.
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proposals regarding specific corporate decisions.”243 The shareholder veto “does
not help shareholders to effect changes when the board prefers the status quo,” nor
does it “secure the arrangement that would best serve shareholder interests.”244
Bebchuk proposes reforms that would expand shareholder power beyond
effectuation of negative preferences to the direct effectuation of affirmative
preferences through rights of initiation. For instance, Bebchuk proposes that,
subject to certain conditions, shareholders be empowered to initiate “rules-of-thegame decisions” to amend the corporate charter or reincorporate in another state, in
addition to “game-ending” decisions, and “scaling-down” decisions.245 Bebchuk
therefore suggests that shareholders be permitted to override management
discretion over fundamental affirmative decisions, such as putting the company up
for sale, beginning a process of dissolution, distributing dividends, and accepting
particular merger or consolidation proposals offered by a bidder—all decisions
currently entrusted to management’s exclusive initiation.246
Other proposals are less sweeping but similar in their affirmative spirit. Even
before Bebchuk, Robert Thompson and Gordon Smith had earlier proposed that
shareholders be able to “initiate action that would put the company up for sale.”247
Along similar lines, Julian Velasco proposes that shareholders be authorized to
initiate an auction of the company by a majority vote of outstanding shares.248
Shareholders would be able to demand that the board sell all the company’s shares
or assets to the highest bidder. For his part, Lawton Hawkins proposes that, as a
response to excessive executive compensation, shareholders be empowered by
bylaw to appoint nonexecutive compensation representatives.249 The three largest
eligible shareholders of the company would gain the power to appoint a
representative who would act at their direction on all compensation committee
meetings and all board of directors meetings that concern CEO compensation.250
These proposed reforms seek to grant shareholders a different kind of
prerogative than reforms that seek mainly to reinforce a shareholder veto. Such a
change would more clearly alter the traditional split of authority between
shareholders and management, and it is useful to distinguish between this move and
efforts simply to reinforce shareholder veto rights with reference to the different
type of shareholder preference they seek to effectuate. Rights of initiation by
shareholders represent a more direct intrusion on management’s centralized control
and unique expertise regarding company affairs. As such, proposals such as
Bebchuk’s are motivated by a vision of shareholder voting directed toward
shareholders’ affirmative preferences over the best course of action for the
company, rather than a simple veto over management discretion. To the point,

243. Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 836.
244. Id. at 838.
245. Id. at 837.
246. Id. at 895–907.
247. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 308 (2001).
248. Velasco, supra note 53, at 669–72.
249. Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to
Excessive CEO Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 470–87 (2007).
250. Id. at 473.
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Bebchuk’s major concern about the negative structure of shareholder voting is that
“veto power does not help shareholders to effect changes” and “would not secure
the arrangement that would best serve shareholder interests.”251
Of course, there are times when shareholders may wish to override
management’s discretion in value-enhancing directions that management, for selfinterested reasons, would otherwise oppose. Here, a wider and more far-reaching
range of shareholder rights of initiation might be attractive. What is more, the
opportunity for motivated shareholders to propose affirmative actions by the
corporation under Bebchuk’s proposal might put before the shareholders more
value-enhancing options that the shareholders might happily embrace, even if they
would not have invested the resources to develop as a collective. Shareholders
might then have greater ability to approve value-enhancing measures that would
otherwise be discouraged by current law and blocked by management efforts.
However, it is important to underscore the difference between stronger rights of
oversight and veto aimed at negative preferences on one hand, and Bebchuk’s
proposal for rights of initiation on the other hand. Bainbridge argues that “giving
investors [the] power of review differs little from giving them the power to make
management decisions in the first place.”252 But there are important differences in
the (i) degree of ex ante interference with management direction and (ii) the
informational demands on shareholders as voters.
First, rights of initiation do more than simply require management to obtain
some requisite level of ex post shareholder consent for their decisions. They permit
shareholders to direct the company in the first instance toward choices that the
management opposes, and they tend to require extensive efforts from some
initiating shareholder who is likely to emerge only because her economic
motivations diverge from the average shareholder’s interests. By contrast, oversight
through negative veto should pose less interference with the benefits of centralized
board management than the affirmative rights of initiation that Bebchuk proposes.
Rights of negative veto can be structured such that shareholders as a class are
presented with binary choices that require little more than a single-shot ex post
decision on an agenda shaped largely by management. This economy of decision
making allows shareholders to delegate operation of the company to specialized
management, but retain some meaningful check on management necessary in light
of the inherent agency problem in corporate governance. The negative structure of
shareholder voting better negotiates this tension between managerial discretion and
accountability that Bainbridge and others identify.
Second, proposals for new rights of initiation by shareholders present a
materially different framework for shareholder voting. As I have explained, the
veto structure of shareholder voting conforms to the preferences of shareholders.
Shareholders generally limit their decision making to whether to veto management
in a simple binary choice—for any action recommended by management,
shareholders’ usual deference to management is guided in large part by their
standing opinion of management. Beyond these management proposals, the only
voting matters that garner serious consideration from shareholders pertain to

251. Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 838.
252. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 626.
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corporate governance measures about which shareholders, particularly institutional
shareholders, tend to have their own standing opinions. As Brett McDonnell
explains, shareholders are “likely to be rather well-informed on such issues”
because “many corporate governance issues . . . are likely to arise at many different
corporations, raising the same general questions at each.”253 In other words,
shareholders are able to decide almost every question of shareholder voting under
current law based largely on their standing opinions about management and wellestablished corporate governance measures such de-staggering boards and poison
pills.
By contrast, wider rights of initiation for shareholders potentially complicate
this neat economy of decision making. For example, Bebchuk’s proposal would
empower a qualified shareholder to propose putting the company up for sale, or
begin a process of dissolution, among other things.254 To decide how to vote on
such matters, shareholders can again refer to management’s position on the
question, but when shareholder proposals go beyond established measures of
corporate governance, shareholders need more information to evaluate such
questions of business strategy on their substantive merits. On such questions, as
critics of shareholder voting reform argue, shareholders do not enjoy any
informational advantages over management. Nor are shareholders as easily able to
fall back on their heuristic judgments about the proposers’ credibility. Shareholders
are unlikely in these cases to know much about the proposing shareholders
competence or motivations, relative to what they know about management.
Shareholders may need instead to engage in the open-ended inquiry necessary to
determine one’s affirmative preference about the company’s best course of action.
None of this is necessarily to say conclusively that Bebchuk’s proposal, nor
other proposals for wider rights of initiation by shareholders, are bad ideas. Such
approaches may be useful, but they complicate the usual economy of decision
making by shareholders. They require judgments from shareholders about not only
management, but assessments of their fellow shareholders’ credibility and
motivations across a wide range of potential issues. Rights of initiation diverge
from the usual strengths of shareholder voting as veto and require more difficult
judgments. Bebchuk’s proposal would present voting decisions that are at least as
complicated as the most difficult judgments that shareholders currently make, and
at their most complicated, much more difficult judgments than shareholders
currently make. Shareholders would need to develop something closer to
affirmative preferences and therefore would need better information, or at least
alternative heuristics that can be cheaply and reliably acquired. In this sense, rights
of affirmative initiation for shareholders represent a bigger break from the usual
understanding and practices of shareholder voting.

253. Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison
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CONCLUSION
The lasting value of understanding shareholder voting as veto is a re-orientation
of the debate about shareholder voting. This active debate, as it always has been,
pits those who desire a higher quantum of shareholder influence against those who
fear any increase of shareholder influence over corporate management. This Article
argues that the shape of shareholder influence through shareholder voting matters
as much as its quantity. Shareholder-voting reform that builds upon this model of
shareholder voting as veto offers the most certain path to balancing the basic
tension between shareholder oversight and an efficient norm of management of
discretion. The insights of shareholder voting as veto provide a useful model as
pressure builds for shareholder-voting reform and as new iterations of reform
become politically viable as never before, particularly at the federal level.

